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THE PARTY’S OVER: ESTABLISHING
NONPARTISAN MUNICIPAL ELECTIONS IN
NEW YORK CITY
Karen I. Chang*
INTRODUCTION
Over the course of the last century, cities across the United
States have increasingly been adopting nonpartisan local election
systems.1 Today, a majority of the nation’s cities utilize
nonpartisan elections,2 and sixty of the seventy-five largest U.S.
cities have elected their mayors in nonpartisan elections.3 New
York City is considering joining the majority by changing to a

* Brooklyn Law School Class of 2004; B.A., Wellesley College, 2000.
The author would like to thank her parents, Morgan and Eileen, her sister
Gloria, Steve Wu and Hae Jin Shim for their love, support and
encouragement. She would also like to thank the editors of the Journal of Law
and Policy for their invaluable comments and guidance.
1
WILLIS D. HAWLEY, NONPARTISAN ELECTIONS AND THE CASE FOR
PARTY POLITICS 14 (1973).
2
See NEW YORK CITY CHARTER REVISION COMM’N, PRELIMINARY
OPTIONS: NONPARTISAN ELECTIONS 14 (2002) [hereinafter PRELIMINARY
OPTIONS]. Of the fifty largest cities, only nine utilize partisan systems,
including New York, N.Y.; Phila., Pa.; Indianapolis, Ind.; Baltimore, Md.;
Washington, D.C.; Charlotte, N.C.; Tucson, Ariz.; Tulsa, Okla. and St.
Louis, Mo. NEW YORK CITY CHARTER REVISION COMM’N, THE CITY IN
TRANSITION: INTERIM SUCCESSION AND THE MAYORALTY, at E-12 to E-15
(2002) [hereinafter CITY IN TRANSITION].
3
PRELIMINARY OPTIONS, supra note 2, at 14. Cities currently using
nonpartisan elections include Boston, Mass.; Houston, Tex.; Dallas, Tex.;
Detroit, Mich.; Los Angeles, Cal.; Phoenix, Ariz.; San Antonio, Tex.; San
Diego, Cal.; San Francisco, Cal.; and Seattle, Wash. See id.
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nonpartisan process for local elective offices.4 In July 2002, New
York City’s Mayor Michael Bloomberg appointed a thirteenmember commission—including civic, community and business
leaders—to review the election format change.5 On September 3,
2002, the Commission decided to defer proposing the nonpartisan
issue as a 2002 ballot referendum.6
New Yorkers, political officials and policy analysts have
voiced various and divergent opinions as to whether such a
change to the local election system will benefit New York City.7
The argument against nonpartisan elections typically focuses on
the concern that nonpartisan elections would reduce voter
turnout—primarily among minorities and those of lower
socioeconomic backgrounds—by discouraging one of the primary
“institutional mechanisms through which individuals organize
their political decision making.”8 In contrast, advocates believe
that in New York, where one political party heavily dominates,
“the outcome of the elections is often effectively decided in the
primary,” in which only a narrow subsection of eligible voters
participate.9 They believe nonpartisan elections would open the
decision-making process to the entire population and stimulate
competition, which would compel candidates to address at the
outset issues facing the broad constituency.10
4

CITY IN TRANSITION, supra note 2, at 68. Local elective offices include
those for mayor, public advocate, council member, borough president and
comptroller. See id.
5
Id. at 4.
6
Charter Revisions to Establish a Nonpartisan Local Election System:
Hearing on Proposed New York City Charter Chapter 3 Before the New York
City Charter Revision Commission (Sept. 3, 2002) [hereinafter Hearing (Sept.
3, 2002)] (statement of Robert Maguire, Chair of the 2002 Charter Revision
Commission).
7
See CITY IN TRANSITION, supra note 2, at 11-13 (summarizing the scope
of the commission’s charter revision review, including the public hearings
held, expert testimony heard and public comments solicited).
8
HAWLEY, supra note 1, at 64. See also, infra Part III (describing the
potential harm to voters of lower socioeconomic background as a primary
argument against use of a nonpartisan election system).
9
CITY IN TRANSITION, supra note 2, at 84-85.
10
PRELIMINARY OPTIONS, supra note 2, at 26 (reviewing arguments in
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Structurally, nonpartisan elections eliminate the preferential
position given to political parties in local elections; they do not,
however, prohibit their participation in electoral campaigning.11
Beyond the influence of a candidate’s party affiliation, other
mechanisms that inform the local electorate enhance and
influence the mental framework voters construct in making
voting decisions.12 Part I of this note describes the historical
background of nonpartisan elections in the United States,
including the originating principles for nonpartisan elections and
the structural changes implemented under a nonpartisan election
format. Part II describes statutory and case law support for the
election format change, highlighting underlying policy goals. Part
III describes the current arguments for maintaining New York
City’s current election format and the concerns regarding
possible detrimental effects nonpartisan elections would have on
the city’s electorate. Part IV argues that nonpartisan elections
would reinvigorate New York City’s local electorate because the
role of political parties in local elections is fundamentally
different than those at the state or national level. Moreover, a
nonpartisan system would significantly increase competition in
New York City’s local elections and break down the conclusive
role political parties play in the city’s effectively single-party
system. Part V suggests supplemental actions and legislation that
should be taken if and when voters decide to give nonpartisan
favor of nonpartisan elections, including that they would “force candidates to
address issues facing the population as a whole, rather than the narrow group
of insiders who tend to vote in partisan primaries”); Joseph Mercurio,
Nonpartisan Elections: Can Bloomberg Extend His Success to Another
Campaign Promise?, Nat’l. Pol. Serv., Inc., at http://www.nationalpolitical.
com/column126.htm (June 21, 2002) [hereinafter Mercurio, Bloomberg’s
Campaign Promise] (discussing the benefits of a competitive election).
11
EUGENE C. LEE, THE POLITICS OF NONPARTISANSHIP 97 (1960). See
infra Part I.B.1 (discussing the structures of existing nonpartisan election
laws).
12
See HAWLEY, supra note 1, at 53 (explaining that the mass media is a
primary source of political information, particularly when political parties are
inactive). Other informative mechanisms include the media and the
government-produced Voter Guide. See infra Part V.C.3.d (discussing the
various sources of electoral information available to voters in New York).
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elections a chance.
I. BACKGROUND AND STRUCTURE OF NONPARTISAN ELECTIONS
The history of the national and local trends toward
nonpartisan municipal elections, as well as the variety of possible
nonpartisan electoral structures, provide the background
necessary to understand the policy and legal concerns at issue
today. The current rationales for implementing nonpartisan
elections are similar to the original motives in some respects
while dissimilar in others, due to development within differing
historical contexts. Understanding the different structures should
inform New York City’s legislative drafters in the structure the
city chooses to implement, should it decide to establish
nonpartisan elections.
A. Historical Background
As the nation’s election systems formalized and increased in
complexity at the turn of the twentieth century, state and local
governments gained greater independence and flexibility to
modify their election laws, which in turn stimulated the parallel
development of nonpartisan and partisan election systems.13
1. The National History of Nonpartisan and Partisan Elections
Both partisan and nonpartisan local election systems grew out
of the initial shift from voice voting to a paper ballot system in
the late nineteenth century.14 The first paper ballot forms in the
United States, distributed in Kentucky in 1888, tracked
Australian and British ballots by not including party
designation.15 A variety of nonpartisan primary election systems
13

See LEE, supra note 11, at 31 (discussing the link between municipal
home rule and the freedom of local politics from national parties); infra Part
II.A (explaining the purpose and structure of municipal home rule laws).
14
LEE, supra note 11, at 20.
15
Id. (describing Kentucky’s new statutory requirement that paper ballots
be printed and distributed at the state’s expense).
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developed in different cities, similar to the diverse systems that
exist today.16 While nonpartisan election systems were under
development, election reformers advocated two other related
measures: (1) separating city elections from state and national
elections, either by varying the date or by scheduling them for
odd-numbered years; and (2) creating a “short ballot,” which
entailed changing many administrative positions from elective to
appointive positions.17 Alternating election years facilitated the
implementation of nonpartisan elections, which required different
ballot structures, but also reflected the general belief that
municipal issues were reasonably separate from national
partisanship.18 The short ballot was considered an essential
feature in conjunction with nonpartisan elections.19
Cities like Boston, Massachusetts, and Berkeley, California,
began revising their election laws to implement nonpartisan
elections in the first decade of the twentieth century.20 At the
same time, there was movement to apply the nonpartisan ballot to
judicial elections.21 California and Arizona were the first to adopt
16

Id. at 21-22. The nonpartisan election structures that developed
included a runoff of the top two primary candidates, no runoff if a candidate
received a majority primary vote, or no primary and a simple plurality win.
Id; see also Part I.B (listing current nonpartisan election structures used in
cities across the United States).
17
LEE, supra note 11, at 22. Some nonpartisan advocates have stressed
that nonpartisan elections necessitate the short ballot. Id. at 32 (noting the
position held by leading nonpartisan supporter Richard Childs, Executive
Committee Chairman of the National Municipal League in the 1950s).
18
Id. at 22; ERNEST S. GRIFFITH, A HISTORY OF AMERICAN CITY
GOVERNMENT: THE CONSPICUOUS FAILURE, 1870-1900 283 (1974). A similar
problem has been discussed recently with regard to the ability of voting
machines to handle nonpartisan and partisan election formats simultaneously.
See CITY IN TRANSITION, supra note 2, at 95-96. The Charter Revision
Committee’s staff members, however, have stated that available federal and
state funding sources will provide sufficient resources to procure new
machines capable of implementing this change. Id. at 98.
19
LEE, supra note 11, at 22.
20
Id. at 22-23 (describing the earliest movement to nonpartisan systems,
and noting that “[o]ther California cities quickly followed suit”).
21
LEE, supra note 11, at 23 n.11 (indicating that in 1950, seventeen
states held nonpartisan judicial elections).
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this system, and other states soon followed.22
In 1888, the same year that Kentucky implemented a
nonpartisan ballot, Massachusetts adopted a ballot that included
party designation.23 Massachusetts’s decision to use a partisan
ballot sought to resolve the problem voters experienced in
elections that utilized laundry list ballots—ballots including a
dozen or more offices with no identifiable party affiliation or
endorsement.24 Adding party affiliation to the ballot created the
need to legally define “political party” and to recognize party
nominations of candidates at the primary level.25 State, district
and local governmental regulation followed the development of
formalized party activity, and nominating conventions became
their regulatory focus.26 Nominating convention laws made way
for state-wide direct primary laws, in which party candidates are
elected by the general party membership.27
Nonpartisan elections became a major municipal reform issue
during the Progressive Era, a movement at the turn of the
twentieth century that sought to combat the corruption within city
governments controlled by political party bosses.28 The municipal
reform movement was premised on the lack of trust in political
22

Id. at 23.
Id. at 21.
24
Id. In 1909, however, Boston became the first large city to establish
nonpartisan elections. Doug Muzzio, Editorial, Nonpartisan Elections and
Charter Revision, GOTHAM GAZETTE, Jan. 1, 2003 [hereinafter Muzzio,
Charter Revision], available at http://www.gothamgazette.com/article/voting/
20030122/17/196.
25
LEE, supra note 11, at 21. A political party was defined as “an
organization casting a certain percentage of the aggregate vote.” Id.
26
Id.
27
Id.
28
See Nancy Northup, Local Nonpartisan Elections, Political Parties and
the First Amendment, 87 COLUM. L. REV. 1677 (1987) (reviewing the origins
of the widespread establishment of nonpartisan elections). See also HAWLEY,
supra note 1, at 8 (offering analysis of the “elitist origins of nonpartisanship in
city politics”). Besides “elite” reformers, the progressives also included
journalists and civic and religious leaders angered by increasing urban poverty
and poor living and working conditions. Id. at 9. As Hawley explains, the
motives that drove activists were often contradictory. Id.
23
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parties and politicians and the belief that “[c]ity government is
largely a matter of ‘good business practice’ . . . or . . .
‘municipal housekeeping,’” in which the issues of a city council
are only minimally political in nature.29 Thus, the municipal
progressive movement emphasized efficiency and economy as its
leading objectives.30
Since the Progressive Era, most cities have established
nonpartisan municipal elections.31 As of 1991, approximately
three-fourths of all municipalities in the United States utilized
nonpartisan elections.32 Although the massive municipal
corruption that fueled the nonpartisan movement during the
Progressive Era is no longer an articulated premise for switching
to a nonpartisan election format,33 advocacy for nonpartisan
29

LEE, supra note 11, at 28.
HAWLEY, supra note 1, at 9. Some went as far as analogizing the city
to a corporation. Id. at 10 (quoting Andrew D. White, a leading reformer and
the President of Cornell University in 1890). At the same time, White and
other reformers also shared the elitist notion that a partisan system was
dangerous in that it would theoretically allow the city to be controlled by the
urban poor and new immigrants. Id.
31
See id. at 14 (describing the increase in the number of cities
establishing nonpartisan municipal elections between the 1930s and 1960s);
CITY IN TRANSITION, supra note 2, at 82 (describing the current use of
nonpartisan elections by “an overwhelming majority of cities across the
nation”).
32
See Schaffner et al., Teams Without Uniforms: The Nonpartisan Ballot
in State and Local Elections, 54 POL. RES. Q. 1 (Mar. 2001).
33
For example, Chicago, Ill., was among five of the ten largest cities that
were notoriously corrupt at the end of the nineteenth century. GRIFFITH, supra
note 18, at 10 (describing the extent of corruption across the country and
noting that political parties were usually involved in the municipal corruption).
When Chicago established nonpartisan elections for citywide public offices for
the 1999 elections, however, its primary impetus was not to rectify corrupt
government practices but to improve cost-efficiency in light of the hybrid
election systems used between aldermen and citywide officeholders and the
reality that the primary became the more important election due to the
dominance of Democratic voters. See Scott Fornek, The Party’s Over:
Mayoral Primaries Get the Ax, CHI. SUN-TIMES, July 8, 1995, at 1
(discussing the elimination of party primaries in Chicago’s mayoral elections).
Moreover, because of the party’s historical dominance over Chicago’s local
elections, a majority of Chicago Republicans had chosen to vote in Democratic
30
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elections continues under a broader set of rationales. Some
continue to support the nonpartisan format on the historical view
of local governance as more operational than political.34 Others,
however, view the political party hierarchy as having too much
control over the outcome of elections, causing candidates to be
more accountable to the party institution than to the public.35
Supporters of nonpartisan elections consider the nonpartisan
structure as returning candidate accountability to the people and
their community issues.36
2. The History of Nonpartisan Elections in New York City
New York City was a paradigm of the corruption that fueled
the Progressive movement. In the 1860s and 1870s, New York
City was under the control of the “Tweed Ring,” the political
machine that exercised political dominance through combined
acts of charity and patronage.37 Under the control of Party
“Boss” William Marcy Tweed, the city was, among other things,

primaries, a sign that the existing party primary system was not effective.
Steve Neal, Established Candidates Benefit from New Rules, CHI. SUN-TIMES,
Dec. 21, 1998, at 9. The Illinois General Assembly passed the election law in
1995, thereby unifying their system of electing aldermen (analogous to New
York’s city council members) and citywide officeholders. Id.; Thomas Hardy,
Edgar is Set To End City Partisan Votes, CHI. TRIB., July 7, 1995, at 3.
34
PRELIMINARY OPTIONS, supra note 2, at 28 (summarizing supporters’
belief that because city government is largely operational, “the value of the
party banner and the ideals it represents is minimal at best”).
35
See, e.g., Neal, supra note 33 (pointing out that the Democratic Party
has owned Chicago’s City Hall since 1931).
36
CITY IN TRANSITION, supra note 2, at 84 (summarizing comments from
public officials and the public in support of nonpartisan elections); e.g., Id. at
E-7 (summarizing Professor Fred Siegal’s contention that the existing election
system in New York City fails to ensure that officials are accountable to the
public).
37
See GRIFFITH, supra note 18, at 71-73. The political machine gained
the loyalty of new immigrants by assisting them in obtaining employment and
pre-election citizenship. Id. at 72-73. The new immigrants expressed their
thanks through their votes, overlooking electoral fraud and financial abuses.
Id.
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defrauded of millions of dollars.38 The efforts of reformers and
the New York Times in exposing the Tweed Ring corruption
finally brought an end to their control in 1871.39 Yet, unlike
cities whose corruption led to implementation of nonpartisan
elections, the corruption in New York City at that did not result
in a change in its electoral system.
In the early 1960s, a task force was appointed to review New
York City government.40 The task force examined nonpartisan
mayoral elections in large cities of comparable size.41 They
decided not to implement them in New York, however, because
they found that in other large cities, voters were still well aware
of the party backings of candidates, and if the premise for
changing to nonpartisan elections was to remove the party from
the election process, nonpartisan elections would fail to do so.42
In 1986, New York City voters approved special nonpartisan
elections through a referendum, which amended certain
provisions of the City Charter, including the method of filling
vacancies for City Council or Borough President.43 Under the
post-referendum provisions, special election candidates are
nominated by independent petitions rather than by party
committee, and party affiliation may not be included on the
ballot.44 In 1991, the New York City Board of Elections refused
to comply with the new charter provisions, claiming that the
provisions contradicted New York State Election Law, which
allows party labels, and arguing that city rules must yield to state

38

See id.
See id. at 69, 74.
40
See Edward Costikyan, Editorial, The Case Against Bloomberg’s
Charter Revisions on the Mayor’s First Major Misstep—A Plan That Calls For
a ‘Well-Deserved Death,’ N.Y. SUN, July 29, 2002, at 6. Costikyan was
appointed by former governor Nelson Rockefeller to head this task force. Id.
41
See id.
42
See id.
43
See Dick Zander, Minority Challenge to Charter Change, NEWSDAY,
Nov. 28, 1988, at 20.
44
See Cerisse Anderson, Party Designation Barred in Special Council
Election, N.Y. L.J., Apr. 4, 1991, at 1.
39
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law.45 Thomas J. Manton, Chairman of the Democratic Executive
Committee of Queens County, intervened and contended that the
nonpartisan provisions violated his party’s First Amendment right
to free speech.46 The Supreme Court of New York upheld the
charter revisions, and the Appellate Division affirmed, finding no
contradiction between the state law and the charter revision and
no First Amendment violation.47
New York’s Municipal Home Rule Law provides for
appointment of a charter revision commission in New York City
through, among other methods, mayoral action.48 The
Commission is charged with reviewing the City Charter and
proposing a new charter or revising the existing one.49 Former
Mayor Rudolph Giuliani began researching the possibility of
implementing nonpartisan elections for all municipal offices in
1998.50 The New York City Charter Revision Commission has
since annually examined the possible benefits and disadvantages
of such a procedural change.51 The 1998, 1999 and 2001
Commissions examined the possibility of establishing nonpartisan
45

City of New York v. New York City Bd. of Elections, No. 41450/91,
at 3 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Apr. 3, 1991), aff’d,
A.D.2d
(1st Dept.), appeal
denied, 572 N.E.2d 50 (Mem.) (Apr. 10, 1991). In New York City Board of
Elections, the city sued to enjoin the Board of Elections from including the
party affiliation of a Queens County City Council candidate on the special
election ballot, pursuant to the newly established nonpartisan rules. Id. See
infra Part II.C (detailing the court’s holding regarding this contradiction).
46
New York City Bd. of Elections, No. 41450/91, at 6 (citing Eu v. San
Francisco County Democratic Cent. Comm., 489 U.S. 214 (1989)). The court
distinguished Eu, however, noting that the statute in Eu, prohibiting political
parties from endorsing candidates in the primaries, was much more severely
restrictive than was the case at issue. Id.; see also CAL. ELEC. CODE § 29430
(2003) (stating that the official governing bodies “shall not endorse, support,
or oppose, any candidate for nomination by that party for partisan office in the
direct primary election”); Eu, 489 U.S. at 217 (citing section 29430 of
California’s Election Code).
47
New York City Bd. of Elections, No. 41450/91, at 6.
48
N.Y. MUN. HOME RULE LAW § 36 (2002).
49
Id.
50
See NEW YORK CITY CHARTER REVISION COMM’N, MAKING OUR
CITY’S PROGRESS PERMANENT 104 (2001) [hereinafter CITY’S PROGRESS].
51
Id.
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elections.52 Although concluding that nonpartisan elections would
be beneficial to New York City, the Commissions deferred the
issue for further studies.53 Giuliani’s 2001 Commission believed
that one reason for the lack of spirited, substantive policy debate
about the city’s future, even as the 2001 primary election
approached, was that the city’s partisan election system “tend[ed]
to foster uniformity, rather than diversity of ideas.”54 They
pointed out that this homogeneous perspective was perpetuated by
the overwhelming dominance of the Democratic Party among the
New York City electorate.55 The Commission’s findings were not
considered full and fair because the members were widely seen as
Giuliani’s personal political tools, chosen to advocate Giuliani’s
position in support of nonpartisan elections rather than conduct
an independent evaluation of the policy benefits and burdens of
such a change.56
In 2002, Mayor Bloomberg, perhaps recognizing the lack of
credibility given to the Giuliani commissions, appointed diverse,
independent members.57 The thirteen members began examining
52

PRELIMINARY OPTIONS, supra note 2, at 14-18 (summarizing the 1998,
1999 and 2001 commissions’ findings and actions).
53
CITY’S PROGRESS, supra note 50, at 104.
54
Id. at 105.
55
Id. More than sixty-five percent of all registered voters are members of
the Democratic Party. See New York State Bd. of Elections, Voter Enrollment
for November 2002, at http://www.elections.state.ny.us/enrollment/enroll.
htm (last visited Apr. 2, 2003). About eighty percent of voters who are
registered with a party are registered Democrats. Id.
56
Douglas Muzzio, Editorial, Bloomberg Jumps the Gun on Charter
Reform, NEWSDAY, July 25, 2002, at A35 [hereinafter Muzzio, Bloomberg
Jumps Gun] (noting that Giuliani appointed three commissions, all chaired by
close associates who had served as deputy mayors). See also Eric Lipton,
Editorial, From Giuliani, a Pitch to Put Parties Aside, N.Y. TIMES, June 16,
2001, at B3 (describing the connections between various Charter Revision
Commission members and Giuliani and his administration).
57
Muzzio, Bloomberg Jumps Gun, supra note 56. See also Editorial,
Charter Reform, Slowly, N.Y. DAILY NEWS, Aug. 31, 2002, at 22
(“Bloomberg’s panel . . . has proved to be as independent as he said it would
be”); Michael Cooper, Mayor Calls Charter Panel’s Rejection of His Plan
Proof of Its Independence, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 4, 2002, at B7 (noting that the
commission’s decision to defer proposing a ballot referendum, which he
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nonpartisan elections but again deferred making a decision.58 In
doing so, the Commission considered input from local
community leaders and members of the general public, as well as
information from a staff with expertise in city government and
the charter revision process.59 The Commission’s decision largely
reflected concerns voiced by the public—that the review process
required further public comment and review and that the hearings
were held during August, when many people are on vacation.60
3. Mayor Bloomberg’s Premises for Establishing
Nonpartisan Elections
Nonpartisan elections were among the leading proposals
promoted by Mayor Bloomberg at the outset of his mayoral
campaign.61 Bloomberg stated that he did not believe the role
political parties play is as central to local governance as it is to
national governance.62 He described the current partisan elections
as allowing “a very small group of people [to] determine who
gets elected” because a proportionately small number of voters
actually participate in the primary.63 He expressed hope that
nonpartisan elections would increase the competitiveness of the
city’s local elections64 and believed the nonpartisan system would
disagreed with, showed their independence); Dan Janison, Mayor’s Charter
Panel a Varied Crew, NEWSDAY, July 13, 2002, at A11 (describing the varied
backgrounds of the 2002 Charter Revision Commission members, which
include members who have had ideological and political conflicts with Mayor
Bloomberg).
58
Hearing (Sept. 3, 2002), supra note 6 (statement of Robert Maguire,
Chair of the 2002 Charter Revision Commission).
59
CITY IN TRANSITION, supra note 2, at 11-13 (discussing the review
procedures used by the 2002 Charter Revision Commission).
60
Id. at 12.
61
Adam Nagourney, Bloomberg Says Elections Should Be Nonpartisan,
N.Y. TIMES, June 8, 2001, at B4. Bloomberg is a quintessential nonpartisan
advocate, as a Democrat-turned-Republican, whose election received the
support of the Independent Party. See id.
62
Id.
63
Muzzio, Charter Revision, supra note 24 (quoting Mayor Bloomberg).
64
Id. (noting a suggestion made by a Bloomberg advisor).
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increase opportunities for candidates to run for an elected
position without submitting to the party hierarchy.65 Bloomberg
also speculated that by taking parties out of their current position
of power more people would participate in the political process.66
B. The Structure of Nonpartisan Elections: What It Is and
What It Isn’t
One of the primary misconceptions about nonpartisan
elections is that they absolutely restrict political parties from
playing any role in the campaign and election process.67
Understanding the various ways in which nonpartisan elections
are, or are not, structured illuminates the purposes underlying the
current nonpartisan movement.
1. Existing Nonpartisan Election Structures
In cities with nonpartisan elections, candidates are placed on
the general election ballot either by nominating petition or by
advancing from a nonpartisan primary.68 In nonpartisan cities that
65

Adam Nagourney, Bloomberg Says Elections Should Be Nonpartisan,
N.Y. TIMES, June 8, 2001, at B4 (quoting Bloomberg, who stated, “You’ve
got to get rid of the partisan politics and party bosses who really limit the
public’s choice”).
66
Muzzio, Charter Revision, supra note 24 (quoting Bloomberg’s
advisor).
67
See, e.g., Press Release, New York State Democratic Committee,
Statement from State Chair Herman “Denny” Farrell, Jr., Reports That
Mayor Bloomberg Will Try to Reduce the Role of Major Political Parties in
New York City Elections (June 17, 2002) [hereinafter “Press Release, Denny
Farrell”] (opposing nonpartisan elections by emphasizing the benefits political
parties provide to the electoral process), available at http://www.nydems.org/
press/pr-06-17-02.html.
68
Northup, supra note 28, at 1683. Independent nominations are used to
reduce the number of candidates eligible to be placed on the primary ballot or
on the general election ballot when primaries are not used. See, e.g.,
ALBUQUERQUE CITY CHARTER art. 2 § 3 (1971) (requiring a candidate to
submit a petition with a specified number of signatures to be placed on the
ballot), available at http://www.amlegal.com/albuquerque_nm/; L.A. CITY
CHARTER § 422 (2000) (using nominating petitions “to qualify a candidate for
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do not hold primaries, the candidate who wins the most votes
wins the election.69 In cities that utilize primaries, all candidates
run in a nonpartisan primary in which all qualified voters are
eligible to participate.70 In some cities, a runoff election is held
only if no candidate receives a majority of votes.71 In such cases,
the primary usually becomes the deciding election. Several cities,
on the other hand, always advance two candidates to the general
election, regardless of whether any candidate receives a
majority.72
Independent petitions are used to nominate candidates either
to the general ballot or to the primary ballot.73 The petitions
require candidates to obtain a threshold number of signatures
before their name can be placed on the ballot.74 Party affiliation
placement
on
the
primary
nominating
ballot),
available
at
http://www2.lacity.org.
69
See CITY IN TRANSITION, supra note 2, at E12 to E15. Those cities
include Memphis, Tenn.; Fort Worth, Tex.; Portland, Ore.; Albuquerque,
N.M.; Virginia Beach, Va.; Colorado Springs, Colo. and Santa Ana, Cal. Id.
70
PRELIMINARY OPTIONS, supra note 2, at 68. See also CITY IN
TRANSITION, supra note 2, at 104 (proposing a draft of a city charter
amendment to provide for nonpartisan elections and requiring that “[e]very
qualified voter shall be entitled to vote at such nonpartisan primary election”).
71
See CITY IN TRANSITION, supra note 2, at E12 to E15. Those cities
include Los Angeles, Cal.; Chicago, Ill.; Houston, Tex.; Phoenix, Ariz.; San
Diego, Cal.; Dallas, Tex.; San Antonio, Tex.; Detroit, Mich.; San Jose, Cal.;
Jacksonville, Fla.; Columbus, Ohio; Austin, Tex.; Milwaukee, Wis.;
Nashville-Davidson, Tenn.; El Paso, Tex.; Denver, Colo.; Oklahoma City,
Okla.; New Orleans, La.; Las Vegas, Nev.; Long Beach, Cal.; Fresno, Cal.;
Atlanta, Ga; Sacramento, Cal.; Oakland, Cal.; Mesa, Ariz.; and Honolulu,
Haw. Id.
72
Id. Those cities include Boston, Mass.; Seattle, Wash.; Cleveland,
Ohio (only if the top two candidates each received over one percent of the
vote); Kansas City, Kan.; Omaha, Neb.; Miami, Fla.; Minneapolis, Minn.
and Wichita, Kan. Id.
73
See Northup, supra note 28, at 1683.
74
See, e.g., L.A. CITY CHARTER § 422 (2000) (requiring any candidate
for mayor, city attorney, controller and member of the city council to collect
signatures of 500 registered voters to be placed on the primary nominating
ballot), available at http://www2.lacity.org; 65 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. §
20/21-28 (West 2003) (requiring candidates for city alderman in Chicago to
collect signatures aggregating “not less than 2% of the total number of votes
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is not included in any of the nomination papers, nor is it included
on the ballot.75
2. New York City’s Proposed Nonpartisan Election Structure
In the nonpartisan election structure considered by the 2002
Charter Revision Commission, candidates’ party affiliations, if
any, are not denoted on the ballot.76 The charter revision draft
cast for mayor at the last preceding municipal election divided by the number
of wards”).
75
Northup, supra note 28, at 1683. The most common attribute of
nonpartisan elections is the elimination of party designation or support from
election ballots. See CITY IN TRANSITION, supra note 2, at 68 (noting that the
essential difference between partisan and nonpartisan elections is whether a
candidate’s party affiliation is denoted on the ballot). The structural change of
listing candidates on the ballot without respective party affiliation labels has
only an incidental legal effect upon political parties in terms of their right to
participate. See Pl.’s Reply Mem. of Law at 4, City of New York v. New
York City Bd. of Elections, No. 41450/91, (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Apr. 3, 1991),
aff’d, __ A.D.2d __ (1st Dept.), appeal denied, 572 N.E.2d 50 (Mem.) (Apr.
10, 1991). Under the nonpartisan format, parties may still “circulate
independent nominating petitions; they may endorse candidates; they may
encourage people to vote for particular candidates; they may, in short, carry
on all their normal functions except that of directly nominating a candidate.”
Id. (explaining the various functions that political parties may still conduct as
part of the campaign process).
76
PRELIMINARY OPTIONS, supra note 2, at i. The removal of the party
label from election ballots is the hallmark of nonpartisan elections. See, e.g.,
L.A. CITY CHARTER § 424 (2000) (stating that “[t]here shall be nothing on
any ballot indicative of the party affiliation, source of candidacy or support of
any candidate”), available at The Official Web Site of The City of Los
Angeles, http://www2.lacity.org. See alsoCITY IN TRANSITION, supra note 2,
at 104 (setting forth section sixty-nine of the “Draft Nonpartisan Elections
Chapter”).
There shall be no partisan, party or independent body identification,
symbol or emblem of any kind for the candidates for the offices of
mayor, comptroller, public advocate, member of the council, and
borough president on the ballot or voting machine at a nonpartisan
primary election or general election conducted pursuant to this
chapter.
Id.
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provided for a primary election and specified that the two
candidates receiving the most votes would always advance to a
runoff election in November.77
The proposed election format for New York City would not
prohibit political parties from endorsing, supporting or opposing
candidates.78 Unlike nonpartisan elections, which attempt to
statutorily eliminate party activism, the nonpartisan structure
proposed by the city would modify only the formal roles parties
currently play in the various stages of the election process,
including the implementation of the closed party primary and
placement of party labels on the ballot.79 In effect, the political
77

CITY IN TRANSITION, supra note 2, 104 (providing section sixty-eight
of the “Draft Nonpartisan Elections Chapter”). This structure is similar to that
in place in Boston and Seattle. See id. at E12 to E15 (briefly describing the
election systems in Boston and Seattle).
78
The proposed nonpartisan election system does not establish “absolute”
nonpartisan elections, which the Ninth Circuit held unconstitutional. See
Geary v. Renne, 911 F.2d 280 (9th Cir. 1990). In Geary, an official
prohibition of party endorsements, approved by referendum, was held to
unconstitutionally violate the First Amendment right of political parties to free
expression, as well as the right of party members to receive an unrestricted
flow of political information. See id. at n.4 (citing the provisions of the
California Elections Code banning party primaries and party labels).
California’s nonpartisan statutes removed the statutory role of political parties
by banning the use of party primaries and party labels on the ballot, but they
did not prohibit political party endorsements. Id. at 282. Nevertheless, due to
the ambiguous legal status of party endorsements in electoral campaigns,
political parties did not endorse candidates in the majority of California
counties. Id. Similarly, the Supreme Court has held that election laws
prohibiting political parties from making primary endorsements violated the
First Amendment freedom of speech and association and failed to serve any
compelling interest. Eu v. San Francisco County Democratic Cent. Comm.,
489 U.S. 214, 229 (1989).
Unlike in California, New York’s proposed system would merely remove
party labels from election ballots and allow all qualified voters to vote in the
primary; it would not prohibit political parties from endorsing candidates
during the campaign process. See CITY IN TRANSITION, supra note 2, at 10204 (providing, inter alia, “Draft Nonpartisan Elections Chapter” sections
sixty-five and sixty-nine, which establish a nonpartisan primary and prohibit
any partisan designations from being placed on the ballot).
79
See CITY IN TRANSITION, supra note 2, at 68 (describing the statutory
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party would be reduced to the same legal status in the political
arena as all other groups in the local community, whether social,
religious, economic or geographical.80
II. NEW YORK STATE AND LOCAL AUTHORITY FOR NONPARTISAN
ELECTIONS
The legal authority for states and municipalities to conduct
nonpartisan elections includes state, local and federal statutes and
regulations, as well as judicial determinations interpreting the
statutes. These authorities define the extent and limit the scope of
state and local power in establishing their election formats.
A. State and Local Statutory Authority for Nonpartisan
Elections
Nonpartisan elections have existed in New York State since
the early twentieth century under New York State’s Home Rule
Law, which implicitly authorizes cities to adopt nonpartisan
elections by charter amendment.81 Section 10 of New York
State’s Municipal Home Rule Law authorizes cities to adopt local
laws related to “the powers, duties, qualifications, number, [and]
mode of selection . . . of its officers . . . .”82 The purpose of
differences between a partisan and nonpartisan system).
80
LEE, supra note 11, at 97.
81
N.Y. MUN. HOME RULE LAW § 10 (2002); N.Y. CONST. art. IX, § 2
(2000). See CITY IN TRANSITION, supra note 2, at 76. New York’s Municipal
Home Rule Law was established in 1924. See Bareham v. Rochester, 158
N.E. 51, 53 (1927).
82
§ 10 (emphasis added). This Home Rule Law directly derives from
Article IX, section 2(c) of the New York State Constitution. N.Y. CONST. art.
IX, § 2 (2000) (providing that local governments have the power to “adopt
and amend local laws [regarding the] . . . mode of selection . . . of its
officers . . .”). Local election structures may differ from those codified in
New York’s state election laws, which provide that “[w]here a specific
provision of law exists in any other law which is inconsistent with the
provisions of this chapter, such provision shall apply unless a provision of this
chapter specifies that such provision of this chapter shall apply notwithstanding
any other provision of law.” N.Y. ELEC. LAW § 1-102 (McKinney 2003); see
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home rule is “to prevent centralization of power in the state, and
to continue, preserve, and expand local self-government.”83
The cities of Sherrill and Watertown instituted nonpartisan
primary systems in 1916 and 1920, respectively.84 Under their
original nonpartisan election procedures, the two candidates
receiving the most votes in the nonpartisan primary advanced to
the general election, regardless of party affiliation.85 Party labels
remained on the ballot, but the law effectively allowed two
candidates from the same party to compete in the general
election.86
B. The Federal Voting Rights Act
The United States Department of Justice (DOJ) examines
whether changes in voting procedures, including a change to
nonpartisan elections, will result in “a denial or abridgement of
the right of any citizen of the United States to vote on account of
race or color . . . .”87 Such denial or abridgment is found:
[I]f, based on the totality of circumstances, it is shown
that the political processes leading to nomination or
election in the State or political subdivision are not
equally open to participation by members of a class of
CITY IN TRANSITION, supra note 2, at 76.
83
People ex rel. Metro. St. Ry. Co. v. State Bd. of Tax Comm’rs, 67
N.E. 69, 72 (1903). See also City of New York v. New York City Bd. of
Elections, No. 41450/91, at 4 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Apr. 3, 1991), aff’d, __ A.D.2d
__ (1st Dept.), appeal denied, 572 N.E.2d 50 (Mem.) (Apr. 10, 1991)
(explaining that New York State Election Law confers upon municipalities the
power to establish their own local laws).
84
See CITY IN TRANSITION, supra note 2, at 78.
85
Id. at 79.
86
Id. Sherrill’s current city charter, however, removes the party label
from all ballots for local elective offices. SHERRILL CITY CHARTER, tit. XIV §
206 (Sept. 2001) (requiring that “[a]ll ballots [including primary, regular and
special election ballots] used in all elections held under authority of this act
shall . . . be without party mark or designation”), available at http://www.
sherrillny.org.
87
42 U.S.C. § 1973(a) (2003). The DOJ is the federal agency charged
with enforcing the Voting Rights Act. 28 C.F.R. § 51.3 (2003).
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citizens protected by [42 USC 1973(a)] . . . in that its
members have less opportunity than other members of the
electorate to participate in the political process and to
elect representatives of their choice.88
Under the Federal Voting Rights Act, New York City must
obtain preclearance from the DOJ before officially amending its
election laws.89 The 2002 Charter Revision Commission hired an
expert in voting rights, Dr. Allan Lichtman, to examine whether
any such violations would arise if New York City were to
implement nonpartisan elections.90 Dr. Lichtman analyzed New
88

§ 1973(b) (emphasis added).
See § 1973(c) (codifying section 5 of the Federal Voting Rights Act);
28 C.F.R. § 51 app. (2003) (listing the jurisdictions covered under the
preclearance section of the Voting Rights Act, including Bronx, Kings and
New York Counties). The DOJ reviews any voting procedure changes made in
cities subject to preclearance to ensure they do not discriminate on account of
race or color. See app. to 28 C.F.R. § 51.1(a) (2003). If the procedural
change will be decided by referendum, jurisdictions may seek prospective
review. See 28 C.F.R. § 51.22 (2003):
With respect to a change for which approval by referendum . . . is
required, the [U.S.] Attorney General may make a determination
concerning the change prior to such approval if the change is not
subject to alteration in the final approving action and if all other
action necessary for approval has been taken.
Id. According to Gerry Hebert, former chief of the Voting Rights Section of
the DOJ, among the 152 requests for preclearance, in which review was
limited to their change to nonpartisan elections, all were approved. Charter
Revisions to Establish a Nonpartisan Local Election System: Hearing on
Proposed New York City Charter Chapter 3 Before the New York City Charter
Revision Commission (Aug. 23, 2002) [hereinafter Hearing (Aug. 23, 2002)]
(statement of Gerry Hebert). Hebert explained that the only time the DOJ
denied preclearance was for a change in school board elections in Georgetown
County, South Carolina in 1994, where the new rule prohibited party
endorsement during the campaign. Id.; CITY IN TRANSITION, supra note 2, at
C-31.
90
CITY IN TRANSITION, supra note 2, at 81. Dr. Lichtman was hired by
the 1998, 1999 and 2002 commissions to perform statistical analyses. Id. Dr.
Lichtman has served as an expert witness for many minority civil rights
organizations, including the NAACP, the Puerto Rican Legal Defense and
Education Fund and the Mexican Legal Defense and Education Fund. Charter
Revisions to Establish a Nonpartisan Local Election System: Hearing on
89
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York City’s voting patterns from the 1989, 1993 and 1997
general elections, examining whether nonpartisan elections would
violate the Voting Rights Act by reducing minority turnout or
harming minorities’ ability to elect their candidate of choice and
concluded that the nonpartisan format would not violate the Act.91
He also examined voting patterns in other cities using partisan
and nonpartisan systems for comparison.92
1. Minority Turnout
To evaluate whether minority voter turnout was harmed more
by nonpartisan elections disproportionately, Dr. Lichtman
examined voter turnout patterns in New York City’s nonpartisan
special elections between 1992 and 1998.93 The statistics showed
that changes in minority and white turnout depended on whether
the election district had a larger minority or white population.94
Moreover, minority turnout increased when there was a
competitive minority candidate on the ballot.95 His results showed
no particular detriment to minority voter turnout in New York
City’s special elections in comparison to white voter turnout.96
Proposed New York City Charter Chapter 3 Before the New York City Charter
Revision Commission (Aug. 15, 2002) [hereinafter Hearing (Aug. 15, 2002)]
(statement of Dr. Lichtman, chair of the History Department at American
University and noted Voting Rights expert).
91
CITY IN TRANSITION, supra note 2, at 81. See 28 C.F.R. § 51.58(b)(2)
(2003) (stating that the Attorney General, in reviewing changes in electoral
systems, will consider as a factor “the extent to which minorities have been
denied an equal opportunity to influence elections and the decisionmaking of
elected officials in the jurisdiction”).
92
CITY IN TRANSITION, supra note 2, at 90 (describing the extent of Dr.
Lichtman’s study, which included an examination of the partisan and
nonpartisan electoral systems of the nation’s 100 largest cities and their effect
on minority voting power).
93
Hearing (Aug. 15, 2002), supra note 90 (statement of Dr. Lichtman).
94
Id.
95
Hearing (Aug. 15, 2002), supra note 90 (statement of Dr. Lichtman).
See infra Part II.B.3 (explaining the correlation between minority candidate
competitiveness and increased minority turnout).
96
Hearing (Aug. 15, 2002), supra note 90 (statement of Dr. Lichtman
explaining that minority voter turnout patterns in New York City’s special
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Similar to these findings, the special elections held in other
major cities—including Washington, D.C., Memphis, Tennessee
and Chicago, Illinois—showed no divergent pattern of minority
turnout compared to white turnout, based on whether the system
was nonpartisan or partisan.97 The primary factor affecting
minority voter turnout in those cities was the competitiveness of
the election, not the partisan or nonpartisan nature of the election
system.98
2. Minorities’ Ability to Elect Their Candidates of Choice
Dr. Lichtman also analyzed the success of minority
candidates under nonpartisan election systems as a gauge to
determine whether the election format change would diminish
opportunities for minorities to elect their candidate(s) of choice.99
Minority candidate success gives a fair approximation of the
electoral success of minority voters because of their tendency to
vote for candidates of their race.100
In his examination of election results in the fifty largest cities,
Dr. Lichtman found not only that party identification was
unnecessary for minority candidates to be elected, but also that a
positive correlation exists between nonpartisan systems and the
election of black and Hispanic mayors.101 Of those fifty cities,
elections from 1992 to 1998 varied based on whether the district was a
majority-minority district, not based on the use of a nonpartisan election
system). In fact, he found that the same voter turnout patterns existed in white
voter turnout during those elections, i.e., that white voter turnout decreased in
majority-minority districts. Id.
97
Id.
98
Id.
99
CITY IN TRANSITION, supra note 2, at E-2; see 28 C.F.R. § 51.58(b)(2)
(2003).
100
CITY IN TRANSITION, supra note 2, at E-2. Dr. Lichtman’s analysis of
minority voter turnout in New York City special elections between 1992 and
1998 also indicates this tendency. See Hearing (Aug. 15, 2002), supra note 90
(statement of Dr. Lichtman).
101
CITY IN TRANSITION, supra note 2, at 82. Dr. Susan Welch, a
professor of political science at Pennsylvania State University, was also
retained by the commission to examine Dr. Lichtman’s analysis, and she
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forty-one utilized nonpartisan elections and nine administered
partisan elections.102 Of the forty-one cities holding nonpartisan
elections, thirty-four percent have elected minority mayors,
compared with twenty-two percent in the cities using partisan
elections.103 Moreover, cities that do not have majority-minority
populations have also elected minority mayors under nonpartisan
systems.104
Dr. Lichtman also examined minority vote cohesiveness to
see whether partisan systems, which are generally unifying
structures,105 would help New York City’s minorities elect
candidates of their race.106 He found that although the three major
minority groups in the city—black, Hispanic and Asian—each
have greater membership in the Democratic Party than the
Republican Party, whites constitute a substantial plurality in the
Democratic Party.107 Moreover, the different minority groups in
the city do not tend to unite behind a single candidate and thus
agreed with his conclusion. Id. at 92. On the other hand, she also expressed
concerns that voters would lose the benefits commonly associated with partisan
election systems. See, e.g., infra Part III (discussing the benefits that political
parties bring to elections).
102
PRELIMINARY OPTIONS, supra note 2, at D-1.
103
Id.
104
Charter Revisions to Establish a Nonpartisan Local Election System:
Hearing on Proposed New York City Charter Chapter 3 Before the New York
City Charter Revision Commission (Aug. 22, 2002) [hereinafter Hearing (Aug.
22, 2002)] (statement of Don Borut). For example, Houston and Dallas both
currently have African American mayors, but their minority populations do
not comprise a majority of their populations. Id.
105
See Kenneth Sherrill, The Dangers of Non-Partisan Elections to
Democracy, 2 SOC. POL’Y 15, 17 (1998) (explaining that parties “provide for
collective behavior [and] collective responsibility” based on rational
expectations that “if a party . . . nominates a candidate, citizens have a
reasonable expectation that . . . the candidate shares the party’s general
perspective”).
106
CITY IN TRANSITION, supra note 2, at C-15.
107
Id. at C-14. Within the Democratic Party, non-Hispanic whites
constitute forty-four percent, blacks thirty percent, Hispanics twenty percent,
Asians three percent and others three percent. Hearing (Aug. 15, 2002), supra
note 90 (statement of Dr. Lichtman citing statistics from 2001 exit polls in
New York City).
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dominate neither the Democratic primary nor the final election
results.108 The statistics regarding minority voting in cities
administering nonpartisan elections, together with broader
analyses of voting patterns in New York City, indicate that
nonpartisan elections will not violate the Voting Rights Act and
may in fact enhance minority voting power.
C. State and Local Judicial Authority for Nonpartisan
Elections
Courts have upheld local nonpartisan election systems in New
York.109 In Bareham v. City of Rochester, the New York Court of
Appeals reviewed various local legislative amendments passed by
Rochester’s City Council.110 Among other things, the court
examined the council’s revisions to local provisions that
abolished the party primary and prohibited placing party labels
on the ballot.111 Finding the provisions statutorily and
constitutionally valid,112 the court resolved a question regarding
the validity of local election laws that are inconsistent with the
state election law.113 The court found that municipalities were
108

CITY IN TRANSITION, supra note 2, at C-14.
See infra notes 110-22 (summarizing judicial authority for nonpartisan
elections in New York).
110
Bareham v. City of Rochester, 158 N.E. 51 (1927).
111
Id. at 148.
112
Id. at 145 (“The local law springs from the Home Rule statute and that
statute descends from the [State] Constitution.”).
113
Id. Article 2, section 10 of the State Constitution required all
municipal officers whose election was not provided for within the Constitution
to be elected by the electors of such cities. Id.; N.Y. CONST. art. IX, § 2
(2000). The State electors’ method utilized party primaries to elect such
officers, in contradiction to Rochester’s new local election laws, which
abolished the party primary and removed the party label from the ballot.
Bareham, 158 N.E. at 54. The court determined that the state and local laws
were not fatally inconsistent, but that the state’s Municipal Home Rule Law
creates a specific method for cities to supercede the general state election law
with regard to its method of electing local officers. Id.; NY MUN. HOME
RULE LAW §11 (1924), cited in Bareham, 158 N.E. 51 at 53. Moreover, the
Municipal Home Rule Law from which the local election laws were derived
descended from the State Constitution, making both the Municipal Home Rule
109
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empowered to modify their local election laws in so far as the
laws affect the election of local officials.114
Bareham states that “[t]he term ‘mode of selection’ expresses
an intent to allow a city to determine not only that it shall cause
its officers either to be elected or appointed but connotes also that
a municipality may define the precise method by which either an
election or appointment shall be effected.”115 The court thus held
that cities in New York possess the authority to establish
nonpartisan elections.116 The decision emphasized that Section 10
of New York’s Municipal Home Law Rule left the decision of
local election format to the city.117 Moreover, the state election
law granted local municipalities legislative deference in
structuring election procedures.118
New York City’s authority to adopt nonpartisan elections was
upheld in City of New York v. New York City Board of
Elections.119 There, the New York County Supreme Court upheld
New York City Charter Section 25(b)(7), which removed party
labels from nonpartisan special election ballots for City Council
Law and the local election laws valid under state law. Id. The court stated that
as long as the city’s laws do not overstep their bounds (e.g., by attempting to
regulate other cities’ election methods) such city laws will be upheld. Id. at
55.
114
Bareham, 158 N.E. at 54.
115
Id. at 146. See supra Part II.A (discussing New York’s Municipal
Home Rule Law).
116
Id. at 144. The court stated that the revised provisions of the City
Charter that provide for nonpartisan local elections “do not conflict with the
[State] Constitution and that no fatal inconsistency exists between them and the
Election Law.” Id. The holding in Bareham struck down the Rochester law,
however, due to the legislature’s failure to cite the election law provisions
being superceded, as required by municipal statute. Id. at 149.
117
Id. at 144.
118
City of New York v. New York City Bd. of Elections, No. 41450/91,
at 4 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Apr. 3, 1991), aff’d, __ A.D.2d __ (1st Dept.), appeal
denied, 572 N.E.2d 50 (Mem.) (Apr. 10, 1991).
119
New York City Bd. of Elections, No. 41450/91. The court’s holding
granted the city’s motion to preliminarily enjoin the Board of Elections from
violating charter section 25(b)(7) by either giving reference to a City Council
candidate’s party affiliation or giving recognition to the Democratic Party’s
certificate of nomination on behalf of a candidate. Id.
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and Borough President and changed the candidate nomination
process.120 The case arose when the Board of Elections
encountered a conflict between New York State Election Law
Section 6-114, which provides that “[p]arty nominations for an
office to be filled at a special election shall be made in the
manner prescribed by the rules of the party,”121 and the voterapproved City Charter Section 25(b)(7), which established a
nonpartisan nominating process by providing for “nomination by
[independent] petitions rather than nomination by party
committee whenever nominations cannot be made by primary
election.”122
The 1988 Charter Revision Commission’s objective in
changing special elections to a nonpartisan format was to “create
a more open and democratic process for filling City Council
vacancies so that Council members can be selected directly by the
people they represent and potential candidates can have equal
access to the ballot.”123 The new nominating process intended to
replace one that gave political party leaders an overly powerful
role in nominating candidates in special elections.124 To fulfill this
objective of enhancing access to the ballot, the Commission
emphasized implementing independent nominating petitions more

120

New York City Bd. of Elections, No. 41450/91. See also Cerisse
Anderson, Party Designation Barred in Special Council Election, N.Y. L.J.,
Apr. 4, 1991, at 1.
121
New York City Board of Elections, No. 41450/91 at 3; N.Y. ELEC.
LAW § 6-114 (McKinney 2003).
122
New York City Bd. of Elections, No. 41450/91 at 7 (quoting the 1988
report of the New York City Charter Revision Commission) (citation omitted).
See also Nathaniel Persily, Candidates v. Parties: The Constitutional
Constraints on Primary Ballot Access Laws, 89 GEO. L.J. 2181 (2001). In
recognizing that primary ballot access laws could undermine voters’
opportunity to cast a meaningful vote, Persily examined how the party primary
structure, essentially determined by the two major political parties, could serve
as a barrier to access to the general election ballot. Id.
123
Pl.’s Reply Mem. of Law at 4, New York City Bd. of Elections, No.
41450/91.
124
Pl.’s Mem. of Law in Supp. of Mot. for Prelim. Inj. at 18-19, New
York City Board of Elections, No. 41450/91.

CHANGMACROX.DOC

604

7/7/03 11:22 AM

JOURNAL OF LAW AND POLICY

than creating nonpartisan elections per se.125
The court concluded that there was no conflict between the
charter and the election law because the State Constitution
conferred upon municipalities the power to establish their own
local election law provisions.126 Thus, Section 25(b)(7) was
upheld notwithstanding New York State Election Law Section 6114, which allows parties to place their candidates’ party labels
on the ballot.127
III. ARGUMENTS AGAINST NONPARTISAN ELECTIONS
Opponents of nonpartisan elections point to purported
successes of the current partisan system for local elections and
highlight concerns that a nonpartisan format might be detrimental
to the city.128 Partisan advocates claim that parties provide a
cohesive ideology, ensure accountability, inform voters, fund
candidates and increase minority electoral influence.129 They
express concern that a nonpartisan system would not only lead to
a loss of these benefits, but also depress voter turnout, increase
dependence on less informative voter cues and lead to an unfair
Republican advantage.130
Supporters of the current partisan election system argue that
political parties should maintain their role in local elections
because of their critical function in connecting people to the
political system.131 Political parties, unlike narrowly-focused,
125

Hearing (Sept. 3, 2002), supra note 6 (statement of Howard Friedman,
Senior Counsel, New York City Law Department, noting that the statutory
provisions do not use the words “non-partisan election” to describe the special
election but do refer to independent nominating petitions).
126
New York City Bd. of Elections, No. 41450/91 at 3.
127
Id. at 4. See Anderson, supra note 120.
128
See infra notes 131-52 and accompanying text (outlining the arguments
of nonpartisan opponents).
129
See infra notes 131-41 and accompanying text (highlighting the
benefits political parties bring to the electoral system).
130
See infra notes 144-51 and accompanying text (discussing the concerns
of partisan supporters with regard to the effects of nonpartisan election
systems).
131
See CITY IN TRANSITION, supra note 2, at 82; see infra notes 132-44
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single-issue organizations, play an important role in “assembling
ideological coalitions” and uniting voters across a spectrum of
issues based on a common policy perspective.132 To that extent,
political parties are useful signals of candidates’ policy
Furthermore,
party
affiliation
promotes
differences.133
accountability of the candidate to a party’s policy orientation,
both as a candidate and as an elected official.134
Political parties also assist voters and candidates by providing
funding and distributing candidate information.135 A party’s
multi-issue, policy-oriented structure makes it an efficient
mechanism to disseminate a candidate’s viewpoint on a broad
and accompanying text.
132
See Charter Revisions to Establish a Nonpartisan Local Election
System: Hearing on Proposed New York City Charter Chapter 3 Before the
New York City Charter Revision Commission (Aug. 13, 2002) [hereinafter
Hearing (Aug. 13, 2002)] (statement of David Yassky, City Council member
representing the 33rd District in Brooklyn, that “[p]arties can be organizers of
ideology and constructors of agenda to which people adhere”). See also Press
Release, Denny Farrell, supra note 67 (discussing the role political parties
play in financially supporting candidates and in offering citizens a way to
participate in public service).
133
See Amy Bridges, Editorial, In Elections, Parties Matter, N.Y.
TIMES, Aug. 30, 2002, at A18 (discussing the benefits that political parties
bring to elections). But see infra note 178 and accompanying text (noting the
divergence of broad national political ideology from localized needs).
134
See CITY IN TRANSITION, supra note 2, at 70 (stating a nonpartisan
opponent view that parties “force candidates to make commitments that result
in political accountability”); Sherrill, supra note 105, at 17 (noting that the
collective behavior and responsibility facilitated by political parties promotes
candidate accountability). But see infra Part IV.C.1 (discussing how the
context of New York’s current partisan system eliminates public official
accountability).
135
CITY IN TRANSITION, supra note 2, at 92 (summarizing Dr. Susan
Welch’s support for political parties and the benefits they bring to the political
system); Bridges, supra note 133 (noting the role parties play in distributing
information); Charter Revisions to Establish a Nonpartisan Local Election
System: Hearing on Proposed New York City Charter Chapter 3 Before the
New York City Charter Revision Commission, (Aug. 21, 2002) [hereinafter
Hearing (Aug. 21, 2002)] (statement of Professor Clayton Gillette, Professor
of Law, New York University School of Law, noting various benefits
provided by parties).
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range of issues,136 and information about a candidate’s position
can only be effectively disseminated to voters if they obtain
adequate funding.137 Partisan advocates argue that, under the
partisan structure, parties support candidates by playing a
significant role in funding their campaigns.138 Political parties’
financial support also helps candidates efficiently convey their
platform through various media.139 In addition to funding
candidates, political parties also “help recruit, train, and support
candidates.”140
Adherents of the current partisan process also cite the
successes that minorities have made within the party structure,

136

See Sherrill, supra note 105, at 17 (describing the historical role of
political parties as a “structured alliance” between a candidate and his
supporters, who support his or her policy issues); Bridges, supra note 133
(noting that political parties “are the only devices thus far invented which
generate power on behalf of the many).
137
Sherrill, supra note 105, at 18 (explaining that “candidates running
without the advantage of . . . party identification will have to raise and spend
much more money to achieve desired levels of name recognition”); CITY IN
TRANSITION, supra note 2, at C-20 (acknowledging partisan advocates’
contention that nonpartisan elections will make it difficult for non-wealthy
candidates to obtain sufficient campaign funds); David Seifman, Betsy:
Nonparty Votes Help Rich, N.Y. POST, Aug. 1, 2002, at 22 (noting Public
Advocate Betsy Gotbaum’s view that Bloomberg’s implementation of
nonpartisan elections will “only help wealthy candidates like himself”).
138
See Sherrill, supra note 105, at 19 (arguing that without partisan
elections, candidates will spend too much of their time in fundraising);
Hearing (Aug. 21, 2002), supra note 135 (statement of Keith Wright, New
York State assemblyman, 70th District). But see infra Part IV.C.3.c
(discussing the New York City Campaign Finance Board’s unique efforts to
financially support candidates and reduce wealth advantages in elections).
139
Hearing (Aug. 13, 2002), supra note 132 (statement of Margaret
Groarke, assistant professor of government, Manhattan College, discussing
various ways that political parties contribute to electoral campaigns). But see
infra Part IV.C.3.d (discussing the variety of electoral informational sources
available to New York City voters).
140
Hearing (Aug. 13, 2002), supra note 132 (statement of Margaret
Groarke). But see infra notes 202-205 (discussing how the current system
creates incentives for elected officials to be more responsive to their party’s
national goals than to their constituents’ local interests).
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particularly in becoming a solid voice in the Democratic Party.141
Within the Democratic Party, blacks constitute thirty percent,
Hispanics constitute twenty percent and Asians constitute three
percent.142 In contrast, in the Republican Party blacks constitute
six percent, Hispanics constitute four percent and Asians
constitute twenty-nine percent.143 Opponents of nonpartisan
elections fear that removing party labels from the ballot will
amount to a setback to minorities in the development of their
political clout.144
Opponents of nonpartisan elections also fear that such a
system would be detrimental to campaigns and the overall
election process. They contend that the reduced role of the party
and the subsequent loss of information typically distributed by
political parties will make it more difficult for the average citizen
141

See, e.g., Hearing (Aug. 13, 2002), supra note 132 (statement of
Yvette Clark, City Council Member, 40th District in Brooklyn, that “[m]any
of our communities are just coming of age with respect to the exercising of
their voting rights”); Hearing (Aug. 21, 2002), supra note 135 (statement of
William (Bill) Perkins, City Council Member, 9th District in Manhattan,
asserting that “[e]liminating the Democratic Party’s official role could have
serious effects for Latino and African American voters who are a growing
force within the party”). See also supra note 90 (delineating the percentage of
minorities enrolled in the Democratic Party in New York City, based on 2001
exit polls).
142
Hearing (Aug. 15, 2002), supra note 90 (statement of Dr. Lichtman).
143
Id. The increase in minority participation was largely a result of
passage and enforcement of the Voting Rights Act. Id. (stating that “urban
politics have largely been transformed over the past several [decades], in part
by the Voting Rights Act”).
144
Hearing (Aug. 13, 2002), supra note 132 (statement of Yvette Clark,
City Council Member, 40th District in Brooklyn, expressing her belief that the
“proposal flies in the face of those of us at the grass roots of our communities
who have labored to register extremely disenfranchised communities to
become active participants in the political process and now stand to face the
rolling back of many of those gains”); Hearing (Aug. 13, 2002), supra note
132 (statement of Oliver Koppel, City Council Member, 11th District in the
Bronx, that “it will disadvantage minority voters to shift from a system that
has allowed one minority to get elected and last year a minority representative
to come very close to becoming the Democratic candidate for Mayor”). But
see infra Part IV.C.3.b (discussing how the nonpartisan system will benefit
minority voters).
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to evaluate competing candidates.145 If political parties no longer
retain their preferred status in local elections, their involvement
may diminish, denying people informational benefits.146 The
feared result is that the reduction in substantive information
contributed by parties to campaigns will depress voter turnout.147
Additionally, some people fear that nonpartisan elections
would leave non-ideological factors like incumbency and name
recognition as the primary cues for voter choice.148 Nonpartisan
opponents contend that nonpartisan elections are less centered on
ideology, and instead turn the electoral process into a
“personality contest.”149
Lastly, a key underlying concern is that nonpartisan elections
will give Republicans an unfair advantage.150 The phenomenon
145

Sherrill, supra note 105, at 20 (stating that removing the party label
will deprive voters “of the historical perspective needed to project the nature
of an administration”); Hearing (Aug. 13, 2002), supra note 132 (statement of
Dorothy Siegel, a community activist from Brooklyn, that “without party
affiliation voters will have no idea who they’re voting for or what candidates
stand for”).
146
See HAWLEY, supra note 1, at 64 (stating that removing the party label
from the ballot will discourage party involvement, consequently “placing
greater demands on [voters’] ideology; cognitive capacity; experience; and
nonparty sources of political communication and mobilization”). But see notes
276-280 and accompanying text (discussing why political parties need not and,
in fact, should not reduce their informal role in the political process).
147
See CITY IN TRANSITION, supra note 2, at 87 (noting that “[c]onflicting
studies were cited concerning whether nonpartisan elections would increase
voter turnout or minority participation”). But see supra Part I, notes 93-98 and
accompanying text (discussing voter turnout). But see IV.C.3.a (discussing the
inapplicability of lower voter turnout concerns).
148
Schaffner et al., supra note 32, at 4 (describing alternative voter cues
used when political parties are removed from the ballot); Margaret Groarke,
Written Testimony Before The New York City Charter Revision Commission,
Brooklyn (Aug. 13, 2002) (on file with author) (citing incumbency, name
familiarity, ethnicity and gender as alternative voter cues).
149
See Hearing (Aug. 21, 2002), supra note 135 (statement of Virginia
Fields, Borough President of Manhattan, that “by cloaking all candidates
under a non-partisan blur, major ideological differences that exist between the
parties are no longer apparent and the process becomes the personality
contest”).
150
HAWLEY, supra note 1, at 77-99 (summarizing studies confirming the
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was found in several studies conducted in the 1960s and 1970s
examining voting patterns in nonpartisan elections and was found
to exist based on the disproportionate likelihood for Republican
candidates to win, compared with the proportional number of
Republican Party registrants in the respective regions.151 The
rationale offered to explain this phenomenon is that Democrats,
who are often members of lower socioeconomic classes, depend
more on parties for information than Republicans.152
The concerns raised are legitimate and should be taken into
account in deciding whether to implement nonpartisan elections
Republican advantage in nonpartisan elections in California between the 1950s
and 1960s). The Republican advantage is also described as a wealth
advantage. See Edward L. Lascher, Jr., The Case of the Missing Democrats:
Reexamining the “Republican Advantage” in Nonpartisan Elections, 44 W.
POL. Q. 656, 657 (1991) (hypothesizing that Republicans’ likelihood of having
greater financial means with which to increase name recognition and improve
candidate image is a possible explanation for the Republican advantage). But
see infra Part IV.C.3.e (discussing the inapplicability of the Republican
advantage to New York City).
151
See Lascher, supra note 150, at 663 (discussing Lascher’s study,
which surveyed California county supervisors elected by nonpartisan elections,
where county supervisor positions are functionally comparable to city council
offices). The Republican advantage was found at all but very high levels of
Democratic voter registration. Id.; HAWLEY, supra note 1, at 33 (discussing
the implications of a study showing a partisan bias in nonpartisan elections for
city council and mayoral positions in eighty-eight cities in California between
1957 and 1966). Interestingly, arguments raising concerns of a “Republican
advantage” were missing from hearing testimonies, but were prevalent in daily
newspaper editorials. See, e.g., Michael Cooper, For City Charter
Commission, First a Goal, Then the Members, N.Y TIMES, Mar. 27, 2003, at
D3 (suggesting that nonpartisan elections could benefit Mayor Bloomberg as a
Republican in a city that is five-to-one Democratic); David Seifman, Bloomy
Charter Vote Chills Pataki, N.Y. POST, July 27, 2002, at 2 (warning of a
potential Republican advantage if New York implemented nonpartisan
elections). Concerns of a wealth advantage were more commonly raised by
public officials. See, e.g., Hearing (Aug. 13, 2002), supra note 132 (statement
of Betsy Gotbaum, New York City Public Advocate, that “nonpartisan
elections certainly favor wealthy candidates”).
152
See HAWLEY, supra note 1, at 63. But see infra Part IV.C.3.e
(discussing why the Republican advantage would not apply in light of New
York’s particular demographics and circumstances).
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in any city. Such an evaluation, however, will be unique in every
municipality, based on city-specific “problems, needs and
resources” that may confirm or diminish the relevance of the
various contentions.153
IV. REINVIGORATING NEW YORK CITY’S LOCAL ELECTIONS
Understanding the distinct rationale for nonpartisan elections
at the local level requires examining the rationale of political
party involvement in national and state electoral campaigns.
Political parties play distinctly different roles at local levels and
therefore warrant independent consideration. Nonpartisan
elections do not dismiss ideology, public policy and political
parties as irrelevant.154 To the contrary, studies have shown that
political party organizations remained active in nonpartisan local
elections in large cities.155 Moreover, nonpartisan elections bring
competitiveness to local elections, empower all registered voters
153

See LEE, supra note 11, at 184. Lee explains that examination of these
community-specific characteristics should be undertaken with the goal of
answering the following questions:
[W]hich system will do most to enhance the twin factors of
competition and consensus essential to the democratic process[?]
Which system will best promote freedom and equality of access to
public office and political activity by all groups in the community?
Which system will best encourage the presentation of alternative
viewpoints on key issues facing the community and relate these views
to candidate choice? And finally, which system will best lead to the
recruitment and election of those men and women of ability and
integrity without whom the community will fail to reach its potential
as a vital force in the life of its citizens?
Id.
154
See Joseph Mercurio, Editorial, Non-Partisan Elections: Mayor’s First
Misstep?, National Political Services, Inc., at http://www.nationalpolitical.
com/column133.htm (August 2, 2002) [hereinafter Mercurio, Mayor’s
Misstep?] (stating that, contrary to views that nonpartisan elections are
intended to remove party activity in elections, “adopting non-partisan elections
is not a plot to eliminate political parties”).
155
See LEE, supra note 11, at 149 (stating that “[r]espondents from the
larger cities more often reported that political party organizations were active
in city elections”).
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to determine the outcome of the election and create incentives for
candidates to put local concerns at the forefront of their campaign
platform and during their term of office. Of course, each
municipality must make its own determination as to the value of a
nonpartisan system by examining local factors such as the size
and diversity of population, financial resources available to
candidates, the vigor and variety of local news and informational
sources and the competitiveness of the local party system.156 The
particular characteristics of New York City, however, indicate
that the time has come for the city to switch to nonpartisan
elections.157
A. The Roles of Political Parties
Although political parties are not mentioned in the
Constitution, the growth and survival of the two-party system
throughout American history and the unique statutory roles of
parties in the electoral process have made them the primary
structure for collective action.158 Political parties facilitate three
major electoral functions: participation, representation and
competition.159 Because of their large constituencies, political
156

See Id. at 29-30.
See infra Part IV.C for a full discussion on the characteristics of New
York City that support the establishment of nonpartisan elections; see also,
Lenora Fulani, Editorial, The Right Time, NEWSDAY, July 30, 2002, at A28
(arguing that “when Democratic Party Professionals argue that more time is
needed to study the issue, they mean that more time is needed to recapture
control of the black vote, one-third of which escaped its grasp last year”);
Michael Kramer, Editorial, Mike’s Voting Reform on the Money, N.Y. DAILY
NEWS, Aug. 7, 2002, at 14 (stating that Mayor Bloomberg’s proposal for
nonpartisan elections is “long overdue”).
158
See LEE, supra note 11, at 113 (arguing that “[e]ffective local
government depends on organized political action by organized groups. Party
organization may not be the best, but it is better than no organization”); see
also Persily, supra note 122, at 2188 (describing the different functions that
political parties play, which largely exist by virtue of their roles as “state
actor-private association hybrids”); supra Part I.A.1 (describing the historical
need to define political parties statutorily, in order to give them official roles
in state and local elections).
159
See Persily, supra note 122, at 2188 (outlining the various functions of
157
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parties can organize individuals to take collective action at a
“massive scale.”160 They also have the unique opportunity to
enhance participation through party primaries,161 which provide
voters the opportunity to select candidates that they believe will
best represent the party and execute the goals of the party’s
platform.162 Partisan election systems, in which political parties
are granted preferred organizational status, are also beneficial as
formalized mechanisms for generating competition, one of the
vital forces behind a thriving democracy.163 One political
sociologist explained the coexistence of competition and
cohesion, stating that “[a] stable democratic system requires
sources of cleavage so that there will be struggle over ruling
positions, challenges to parties in power, and shifts of parties in
office; but without consensus—a system allowing a peaceful
‘play’ of power—there can be no democracy.”164 Parties not in
party primaries).
160
See id.; Sherill, supra note 136, at 16 (noting that political parties
facilitate collective behavior).
161
Persily, supra note 122, at 2189.
162
Id. at 2189; see also Hearing (Aug. 13, 2002), supra note 132
(statement of Margaret Groarke, an assistant professor of government at
Manhattan College, that party candidates will “carry out their program if
elected”).
163
LEE, supra note 11, at 161. In fact, successful partisan elections are
largely premised on the existence of a competitive two-party system. Charter
Revisions to Establish a Nonpartisan Local Election System: Hearing on
Proposed New York City Charter Chapter 3 Before the New York City Charter
Revision Commission (Aug. 20, 2002) [hereinafter Hearing (Aug. 20, 2002)]
(statement of Richard Flanagan, a professor of political science with Staten
Island College). The very rise of political parties in the United States in the
nineteenth century raised voter participation levels to extremely high levels.
Id. Joseph Mercurio, Non-partisan Municipal Elections – An Idea Whose Time
Has Come, National Political Services, Inc., at http://www.nationalpolitical.
com/column121.htm (May 16, 2002) [hereinafter Mercurio, Time Has Come]
(stating that contested elections encourage “responsive government”).
164
LEE, supra note 11, at 157 (quoting political sociologist Seymour
Martin Lipset) (citation omitted). Interestingly, partisan advocates often
emphasize the importance of parties in creating cohesion but fail to mention its
critical counterpart role of generating competition when advocating for
partisan elections in an uncompetitive city. See Sherrill, supra note 105, at 18
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power can fuel “political innovation” and seek “to implement
relatively major changes in efforts to attract large segments of the
electorate to its support.”165 In a partisan election system, parties
create competition by establishing frequent and consistent
channels to air and oppose viewpoints.166
Nevertheless, “[t]hat meaningful competition and opposition
are more plentiful under a partisan system has not yet been
established, . . . and any such generalization must be seriously
qualified by the existence of many cities in which one party has a
preponderant majority and cannot be effectively challenged.”167
As even one political scientist opposed to nonpartisan elections
recognized, partisan election systems are “less likely to be
responsive to needs for social change” in the absence of interparty competition. 168
Today’s national political party committees establish annual
party platforms to articulate their broad policy directions.169 Even
as they attempt to create a cohesive objective, however, one of
the most difficult problems for parties at the national level is
“building and maintaining electoral coalitions,” due to the need
to unite communities with very different social, economic and
political concerns.170 “Uniting diverse and sometimes latently
antagonistic population subgroups into a single and successful
voting coalition has required subordinating inter-group tensions
(noting, in his article opposing nonpartisan elections in New York City, that
parties encourage cohesiveness in politics).
165
HAWLEY, supra note 1, at 164.
166
LEE, supra note 11, at 161. See Persily, supra note 122, at 2190
(explaining that “regulation of the [party] primary can determine the
probability for turnover in government, the number of candidates actively
pursuing voter support, and the chance that challenges to incumbents will arise
at some point of the electoral process”).
167
LEE, supra note 11, at 161.
168
HAWLEY, supra note 1, at 164.
169
See The Democratic National Committee, 2000 Democratic National
Platform, http://www.democrats.org/about/platform.html; The Republican
National Committee, Republican Platform 2000, http://www.rnc.org/gopinfo/
platform (last visited Apr. 24, 2002).
170
See PAUL KLEPPNER, Critical Realignments and Electoral Systems, in
THE EVOLUTION OF AMERICAN ELECTORAL SYSTEMS 4 (1981).
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to party objectives.”171 In fact, holding a broadly cohesive
platform together often “exclude[s] any sustained concern by
parties for policy articulation.”172
B. The Nonpartisan Format is Useful and Legitimate at the
Local Level
The reality of the looser national and state units contrasts
starkly with the ability of candidates to articulate specific
community commitments at the local level. Local candidates, by
virtue of the geographically “local” nature of the community and
its more unified interests, can engage directly with the
community, listen to their constituency and articulate their
responsive commitments, rather than relying on party affiliation
as a primary vehicle to espouse political ideology.173 This distinct
opportunity, compared with those running for state or national
offices, undermines the argument that political party preferential
status is a prerequisite to informed participation.174
Some argue that local governance is distinct from federal
governance inasmuch as it tends to be more managerial and
provision-oriented than party politics-oriented.175 Cities deal with
171

Id.
Id. Political parties’ priority to amass the support of large numbers of
constituents consequently forces them to “couch their platform planks in vague
generalities.” JEWELL CASS PHILLIPS, MUNICIPAL GOVERNMENT AND
ADMINISTRATION IN AMERICA 216 (1960).
173
See Hearing (Aug. 21, 2002), supra note 135 (statement of Michelle
Bouchard, a former city council candidate for the third district in Manhattan,
stating her view that partisan politics at the local level creates dividing lines
and ideological war, and because important issues are not partisan, they should
not be “claimed by either party”); Hearing (Aug. 15, 2002), supra note 90
(statement of Orlando Mayor Glenda Hood expressing her belief, based on her
mayoral experience, that more important than party politics is the importance
of responsiveness of local officials to neighborhood residents’ concerns).
174
See supra Part III (citing arguments by partisan proponents of the
importance of political party activity in distributing candidate information and
encouraging voter participation).
175
Hearing (Aug. 21, 2002), supra note 135 (statement of Professor
Clayton Gillette, a law professor with New York University School of Law).
172
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resource redistribution at a much more local and regional scope,
compared with higher federal offices.176 The problems local
officials address include low-income housing, urban
redevelopment, local crime, social welfare services,
environmental control and land use planning.177 Although the
state and national governments deal with similar problems on a
larger scale, the policy objectives that a national party seeks to
achieve, by virtue of the broader jurisdiction they seek to
encompass, often diverge from the specific needs to which a local
official must respond.178
Studies have shown that, as the population of a city increases,
the likelihood of a local government official running for state and
federal government offices increases.179 Larger population also
enhances the likelihood of a party attempting to “groom” local
leaders for higher office, and in doing so, would implicate the
higher state or national policy agenda, rather than the interests of
a particular district.180 The danger of compromised local
See also Hearing (Aug. 15, 2002), supra note 90 (statement of Orlando Mayor
Glenda Hood explaining that in her experience as Mayor of Orlando, the
issues she has encountered are only minimally related to partisan politics).
176
Hearing (Aug. 21, 2002), supra note 135 (statement of Professor
Clayton Gillette).
177
See HAWLEY, supra note 1, at 182.
178
Hearing (Aug. 21, 2002), supra note 135 (statement of Professor
Clayton Gillette contrasting local and national “economic and political
environment” and the significant differences in objectives sought in resource
distribution and development of the respective local versus national economy).
179
See LEE, supra note 11, at 107 tbl.38 (California “Cities Reporting
Local Officials Having Run for State or National Office”).
180
See id. at 106 (discussing the results of a survey of party chairmen
throughout the state of California, asking the chairmen, “Have you or your
predecessor in the past four years looked to the ranks of city, county, or
school officeholders to seek candidates for state or national office?”). The
survey results indicated that “42 per cent of the chairmen in counties under
50,000 and 62 per cent of those from the larger counties replied they had often
or sometimes looked to the local ranks.” Id. See Hearing (Aug. 21, 2002),
supra note 135 (statement of Professor Clayton Gillette explaining the
possibility that when political parties select candidates with the intention of
promoting them to state or national offices, the candidate’s agenda, by virtue
of his obedience to the party’s agenda, may not be aligned with those of
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commitment is evident when juxtaposing the dichotomous
agendas of local governance and national policy objectives with
the desire of the national party to begin preparing local officials
for higher offices.181
Despite the differences in local versus state and national
campaigning and governance, voters should take candidates’
policy preferences seriously when assessing a municipal
candidate. Studies have shown correlations between a municipal
candidate’s party affiliation and their actions once elected.182 The
correlation is found primarily when examining an elected
official’s willingness to use governmental power actively to solve
problems—Democrats are generally more willing to use
governmental power while Republicans generally seek more
limited government involvement.183 The belief that candidates
affiliated with a certain party publicly uphold certain policy
attitudes, indeed, underlies the fundamental importance of
partisanship.184 The claim that there is “no Republican or
Democratic way to pave a street” fails to acknowledge that policy
attitudes are found in the details of the project.185
Nonpartisan elections are not geared towards hiding candidate
policy leanings, but seek to make local elections more accessible
and competitive, as seen in the rationales that underlie New York
City’s nonpartisan special elections. Moreover, officials, once
elected, remain aware of the party affiliations and policy
perspectives of fellow elected officials and are thus able to form
importance to the city economy).
181
See id.
182
HAWLEY, supra note 11, at 118-19.
183
See id.
184
Sherrill, supra note 105, at 17 (stating that people rationally “associate
political parties with competing philosophies of government”).
185
HAWLEY, supra note 1, at 111; Josh Shipper, The Party’s Not Over,
GOTHAM GAZETTE, Aug. 15, 2001 (stating that the premise for nonpartisan
systems is based on the idea that “[y]ou don’t need to be Republican or
Democrat to pave a road”), available at http://www.gothamgazette.com/
searchlight2001/archives/arch.feature.html. In reality, there are important
policy issues not found in the technical details of paving the street, but in
deciding which streets in which neighborhood to pave, or which streets to give
maintenance priority. HAWLEY, supra.
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alliances when the need arises.186
C. Nonpartisan Elections Will Reinvigorate the Vote in New
York City
The partisan electoral system in New York City has failed to
inspire competition and accountability, and allows election of
public officials by the few rather than by the many. Nonpartisan
elections would reinvigorate the campaign process by opening
primary access to voters and candidates, bringing back the
meaningfulness of voting in a competitive general election,
promoting a broader examination of candidate merits and perhaps
encouraging a more informed vote.
1. New York’s Current Local Election System
Harms All Its Voters
With Democrats comprising more than sixty-five percent of
all registered voters in the city, and about eighty percent of all
registered party members, New York City is effectively a singleparty system.187 In New York City, 4,237,103 people are
currently registered to vote.188 Of that number, 2,819,414 are
enrolled as Democrats.189 Yet, only 785,365 Democrats, less than
one-third of all Democrats, voted in the 2001 mayoral primary,
with even lower numbers voting for their city council
members.190 Among minority voters, these numbers are
186

Hearing, supra note 90 (statement of Orlando Mayor Glenda Hood).
New York State Board of Elections, Enrollment Statistics in November
2002, http://www.elections.state.ny.us/enrollment/enroll.htm (last visited
Mar. 31, 2003) [hereinafter Enrollment Statistics]. See Mercurio, Bloomberg’s
Campaign Promise, supra note 10 (citing similar party enrollment statistics in
New York City in 2001). See also Persily, supra note 122, at 2224 (noting
that political parties have a legitimate interest in creating restrictive primary
ballot access laws to produce a candidate with enough party support to be
competitive in the general election).
188
Enrollment Statistics, supra note 187.
189
Id.
190
Board of Elections in the City of New York, Election Results,
http://vote.nyc.ny.us/pdf/results/2001/primaryElection/ (Oct. 11, 2001). See
187
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proportionally lower.191
At the same time, over 880,000 voters, approximately twenty
percent of the electorate, are affiliated with neither the
Republican nor Democratic Party.192 These numbers indicate that
the current primary system allows the narrow population of party
primary voters to determine the candidates that participate in the
runoff election.193 In almost all municipal offices, the Democratic
Party primary winner claimed victory in a virtually uncontested
general election.194 Thus, with the race practically concluded
Mercurio, Bloomberg’s Campaign Promise, supra note 10 (citing similar
statistics). As an example of the differential in voter participation between
citywide and district council elections, in the 2001 primary, in the 1st District
of Manhattan, 51,799 voters participated in the mayoral Democratic primary,
while only 15,483, less then one-third, voted in the Democratic councilmanic
primary. Id.
191
See Mercurio, Bloomberg’s Campaign Promise, supra note 10.
192
Enrollment Statistics, supra note 187.
193
Hearing (Aug. 15, 2002), supra note 90 (statement of Louisa Chan, a
member of the community school board in district 24 that the city’s primary
system gives a small group of special interest groups control of the entire
election). See CITY IN TRANSITION, supra note 2, at 88 (summarizing
comments by nonpartisan supporters that candidates will be forced to address
issues facing the entire population and not merely those issues voiced by the
“narrow group of insiders who tend to vote in partisan primaries”).
194
Board of Elections in the City of New York, Election Results,
http://vote.nyc.ny.us/pdf/results/2001/generalElection/ (Nov. 28, 2001). For
example, in the election for Public Advocate, the Democratic candidate won
with 845,924 votes, with the closest runner-up receiving only 56,647 votes, a
difference of 789,277 votes. Id. Similarly, the Democratic candidate won the
seat for Comptroller with 768,700 votes, the runner-up receiving 705,357
votes less. Id. In the eighth council district in the Bronx, the Democratic
candidate won in the general election with 16,678 votes, while the runner-up
candidate only received 2,342 votes. Board of Elections in the City of New
York, Election Results, http://vote.nyc.ny.us/pdf/results/2001/generalElection
(Nov. 28, 2001). In the twenty-second council district in Queens, the
Democratic candidate won with 11,354 votes, while the runner-up received
only 6,133 votes. Id. The mayoral election is arguably an exception, as
evidenced by the election of two Republican mayors during the last decade.
See Hearing (Aug. 21, 2002), supra note 135 (statement of former New York
City Mayor Koch); Hearing (Aug. 20, 2002), supra note 163 (statement of
Professor Richard Flanagan that “only six or perhaps seven Council seats, and
I’m being generous here, and the Mayor’s office are competitive in the general
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during the primary in favor of the dominant party and the
candidate selected by this narrow subgroup of dominant party
primary voters, unaffiliated voters and members of other parties
are effectively disenfranchised.195
The ills of our current system afflict all voters, Democrats
included. Supporters of the partisan system encourage voters to
use a candidate’s party affiliation as a proxy for evaluating a
candidate’s policy positions.196 Political scientists particularly
emphasize that voting purely based on party affiliation is a
rational decision made by voters.197 The typical rebuttal is that
insisting on party labels on the ballot sends a message that voters
cannot vote intelligently without the party cue.198 But, as the
election”). Mayor Bloomberg won the 2001 general election with 685,666
votes, only 35,489 votes more than Democratic candidate Mark Green. Board
of Elections in the City of New York, Election Results, http://vote.nyc.ny.
us/pdf/results/2001/generalElection (Nov. 28, 2001). That the mayoral seat is
actually competitive, however, is arguable because in fact, only four
Republican mayors have been elected in the last century. See Shipper, supra
note 185 (quoting former Mayor Giuliani, who stated that he was “only the
third Republican mayor in 100 years”). See also Mercurio, Time Has Come,
supra note 163 (explaining the uncontested nature of the majority of the city’s
elections).
195
See Persily, supra note 122, at 2215-16 (explaining that the
meaningfulness of the vote “derives from its power to determine winners and
losers of elections,” which forms a purpose distinct from those of “voting
booth expression and association” that are fulfilled when voters exercise their
right to vote).
196
Sherrill, supra note 105, at 17 (explaining that voting based on party
affiliation is rational because parties are associated with “competing
philosophies of government”).
197
See, e.g., id.; Schaffner et al., supra note 32, at 2 (stating that
political scientists are “informed by rational actor theories of behavior” and
believe that while “many citizens are going to be poorly informed about, and
only moderately interested in politics, . . . they are able to achieve a
‘collective rationality’ through ‘information short cuts’ such as party labels”).
“Party labels, in this perspective, provide important cognitive information.
They convey generally accurate policy information about candidates and their
low cost and accessibility help voters to reach reasonable decisions.” Id.
198
See, e.g., Hearing (Aug. 21, 2002), supra note 135 (statement by
Peter Holoman; Hearing (Aug. 21, 2002), supra note 135 (statement by Dr.
Jessie Fields, a former Republican and Independence Party candidate for the
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Supreme Court stated:
To the extent that party labels provide a shorthand
designation of the views of party candidates on matters of
public concern, the identification of candidates with
particular parties plays a role in the process by which
voters inform themselves for the exercise of the franchise.
Appellant’s argument depends upon the belief that voters
can be “misled” by party labels. But “[o]ur cases reflect a
greater faith in the ability of individual voters to inform
themselves about campaign issues.199
Party labels are not an inherently wrong way to inform voters
of a candidate’s party affiliation. But, the lack of competition
within a single party system combined with the statutory
preference given to a candidate’s party affiliation create a
disincentive for candidates to address the concerns of their
constituency, since the victory will be won as long as they have
the appropriate party label on the ballot and have made it past the
primary.200 The possibility for patronage and corruption also
increases when a single party dominates and has no viable

United States Congress).
199
Tashjian v. Republican Party of Connecticut, 479 U.S. 208, 220
(1986). In Tashjian, the State Republican Party Committee brought a federal
action challenging the constitutionality of Connecticut’s closed primary law,
which restricted party primary voting such that only party members could vote
in the party primary. Id. at 211. The Court found that the law impermissibly
interfered with the political party’s First Amendment right to define its
associational boundaries. Id. at 225.
200
See Anthony Champagne, Political Parties and Judicial Elections, 34
LOY. L.A. L. REV. 1411, 1413 (2001). In his symposium presentation
examining the role of political parties in judicial elections, Champagne, while
recognizing that party labels provide “a clue” into the attitudes and values of
judges, also noted that a highly qualified judicial candidate could also be
harmed by bearing the wrong party label. Id. Champagne highlighted, as an
example, the judicial elections in Houston, Tex., where Republican straight
ticket voting led to the defeat of nineteen Democratic judges in Harris County
and cited a comment from a law school dean that “if Bozo the Clown had been
running as a Republican against any Democrat, he would have had a chance.”
Id.
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competition in the general election.201
Moreover, the noncompetitive system creates an incentive for
victorious candidates to remain more loyal to the party that
secured the victory than to their constituency, especially when a
potential future in politics at higher state or national offices may
rest in the hands of the party hierarchy.202 Officials whose
loyalties lie primarily with the party hierarchy will be less
responsive to the public in situations where unified local needs
and preferences diverge from state and national policy
objectives.203
The importance of garnering the party hierarchy’s support
also presents an obstacle for candidates who may have good ideas
to improve their community but whose views and interests may
not conform to the party line.204 The harm of the party label
derives less from its presence on the ballot on election day than
from the perpetuation of a process controlled by party hierarchy
entrenched in the partisan local election structure.205
The party-controlled process may have deeper implications
upon the minority community, most of which are Democrats.206
The Democratic Party includes many of the most zealous
nonpartisan election opponents, who often argue that minorities
will be harmed under a nonpartisan system and benefit under the
201

See Northup, supra note 28, at 1681.
See CITY IN TRANSITION, supra note 2, at 84. See also Hearing (Aug.
13, 2002), supra note 132 (statement of Rabbi Lieb Blantz of Brooklyn).
203
See supra Part IV.A regarding the importance of competitive elections
in ensuring responsive government.
204
See Hearing (Aug. 21, 2002), supra note 135 (statement of Michelle
Bouchard, former candidate for city council from Manhattan). See also
Shipper, supra note 185 (describing how a team of a dozen lawyers working
for the Queens County Democratic Organization worked to disqualify onethird of the city council candidates in one Queens County district for technical
errors in their ballot petition signatures).
205
See Persily, supra note 122 (examining the problem of the partycontrolled process, in the context of party-constructed primary ballot access
laws). Persily particularly highlighted how primary ballot access laws have
been used to guarantee “that only the party establishment’s favored nominee
could get on the ballot.” See id. at 2206.
206
See infra notes 207-211 and accompanying text.
202
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current partisan system.207 At the local level, city council
elections are determined by racial demographics, not by
partisanship.208 Harry Kresky, co-chair of the Rules Committee
of the Independence Party of New York, argued that structural
racism within political parties exists not in the city council races,
but in the city statewide races.209 By examining the failure of
various minority candidates to win the Democratic ticket, Kresky
posited that the Democratic Party, rather than empowering blacks
and Latinos, “ensures their status as the most loyal constituencies
whose votes are vitally needed to elect white Democrats to
citywide, statewide and national office.”210 He suggested that
minorities would be more empowered if they acted as a
nonpartisan swing vote, ensuring the election of the best
candidate, regardless of race or party.211
The current partisan election process deprives voters of a
meaningful vote in the election by restricting access where the
final decision is effectively determined, weakens public official
accountability and creates an election system that allows the party
hierarchy to exert too much control.212 Only when New York
207

Supra Part III (stating partisan proponents’ belief that the partisan
system benefits minority voters).
208
Harry Kresky, Editorial, Green Shows the Democrats’ One True
Color, NEWSDAY, Oct. 25, 2001, at A47 (contending that structural racism
exists within the Democratic Party).
209
Id. See also Charter Revisions to Establish a Nonpartisan Local
Election System: Hearing on Proposed New York City Charter Chapter 3
Before the New York City Charter Revision Commission (Aug. 6, 2002)
[hereinafter Hearing (Aug. 6, 2002)] (statements of Harry Kresky, Charter
Revision Commissioner, and Dr. Lichtman, a professor of history with
American University, discussing the hypothesis that due to the effect of
demographics in determining many majority-minority district city council
races, the change to nonpartisan elections would have a marginal effect on the
results of those races).
210
Kresky, supra note 208 (noting the lack of success of minority
Democratic candidates in citywide elections, and pointing out the racist tactics
used by Democratic mayoral candidate Mark Green in his 2001 primary
campaign against Hispanic Democratic candidate Herman Badillo).
211
Id.
212
See supra notes 193-211 and accompanying text (describing how the
current restrictive system deincentivizes official accountability while
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City returns the decision-making power to the broader population
of registered voters will it achieve a genuinely representative
democracy and responsive government.
2. Nonpartisan Elections Will Increase Electoral
Access and Competition
Responsive governments exist when voters determine the
results in contested elections.213 In contrast to the accepted,
expected role of political parties in engendering electoral
competition, the single party system divests parties of any
incentive to use their preferred status to create the competition
necessary to safeguard voters’ choices.214 New York’s municipal
elections are anything but competitive, and this creates
accountability problems.215 The majority of winners in the city’s
local elections face no significant competition in the general
elections, and the critical decisions that determine the election
results are made by a narrow subset of majority party members,
cued by the party hierarchy.216 Often, less than five percent of
effectively increasing party influence).
213
See Mercurio, Time Has Come, supra note 163 (stating that “when
voters have a say in the outcome of elections and there are genuinely contested
elections, the government is more responsive and less corrupt”); see also
William Grady, In a GOP County, 2nd Party Would Be Nice; Poll Shows
Democrat Competition Favored, CHI. TRIB., Aug. 31, 1997, at 1 (noting that
even a local official supported by the dominant party in a one party city
favored competitive elections). “The thing that keeps us all honest
philosophically is when you know there’s somebody out there who wants to
take you out. That’s the inherent beauty of the democratic system.” Id.
214
See supra Part IV.A (discussing the roles of political parties in
electoral campaigns).
215
CITY IN TRANSITION, supra note 2, at E-7 (summarizing Cooper Union
Professor Fred Siegal’s reasons for making all of the city’s elections
nonpartisan). Professor Siegal noted that “[t]he present system is a political
monopoly which eliminates competition and accountability.” Id. See supra
note 194 (delineating statistics from New York City 2001 elections showing
large voting differentials between winning candidates and runners-up).
216
For example, while Public Advocate Betsy Gotbaum won the 2001
general election by a difference of 789,277 votes, her competition was much
narrower in the primary. See Board of Elections in the City of New York,
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Democratic Party members—those who voted in the primary for
the eventual winner—make the determination because partisan
elections encourage straight ticket voting.217 Some voters may
choose not to participate in elections in which their candidate of
choice has virtually no chance of winning.218 Others are
proscribed from meaningful participation due to restrictive ballot
access laws such as the party primary.219 In the case of New York
City’s electoral system, these conditions perpetuate the retention
of control in the hands of the few.220 Nonpartisan elections would
open up access at both the candidate selection and voting phases
of the electoral process and put the election into the broader
Election Results, http://vote.nyc.ny.us/pdf/results/2001/generalElection (Nov.
28, 2001). Gotbaum won the primary with 156,832 votes, but the four closest
runners-up received 105,985; 102,338; 101,424; and 99,914 votes,
respectively. See Board of Elections in the City of New York, Election
Results, http://vote.nyc.ny.us/pdf/results/2001/primaryElection (Oct. 11,
2001). Similarly, while Comptroller William C. Thompson won the 2001
general election with a 705,357 vote lead over his runner-up candidate, his
margin in the Democratic primary was much narrower, receiving 309,032
votes compared to his runner-up, who received 261,637 votes. Compare
Board of Elections in the City of New York, Election Results,
http://vote.nyc.ny.us/pdf/results/2001/generalElection (Nov. 28, 2001) with
http://vote.nyc.ny.us/pdf/results/2001/primaryElection (Oct. 11, 2001). See
supra Part IV.C.1 (discussing the uncontested nature of New York City local
elections).
217
See Mercurio, Bloomberg’s Campaign Promise, supra note 10
(arguing that under our current partisan system, “a tiny portion of [eligible
voters] . . . chose the winner”); Elizabeth Garrett, The Law and Economics of
“Informed Voter” Ballot Notations, 85 VA. L. REV. 1533, 1536 (1999)
(observing that “parties have worked to convince states to adopt the partycolumn ballot, which encourages straight ticket voting”).
218
See, e.g., supra Part II.B.1 (noting statistics that show that white
voters do not participate in the election of district city council members in
majority-minority districts and vice versa).
219
See Persily, supra note 119, at 2189 (stating how party primaries
“exist as a major avenue for political participation [in a] system [that] provides
few opportunities for the average citizen to play a role in the workings of the
democracy”).
220
See Mercurio, Bloomberg’s Campaign Promise, supra note 10
(discussing how few voters actually participate in the primary, the effective
election).
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public’s control.
a. Broader Public Access in Candidate Selection
Increasing public control over the results of the election is
fundamental to a direct democracy.221 Nonpartisan elections allow
all voters to cast a ballot at the primary stage.222 Just as the
Voting Rights Act was enacted to give racial minorities greater
access to the electoral decision-making process, nonpartisan
elections give all voters, regardless of party affiliation, equal
access to candidate selection.223
When access to the primary is widened, the voices and votes
of nonmajority party members and nonparty voters become a
factor in nonpartisan elections.224 In elections with genuine
221

See PRELIMINARY OPTIONS, supra note 2, at 12 (noting nonpartisan
supporters’ desire for a more direct democracy); Hearing (Aug. 20, 2002),
supra note 163 (statement of Jonathan Sassi, a professor of history with
College of Staten Island, reviewing the history of American politics, which
has moved from a more “elitist or deference kind of politics” in the Federalist
days to a more participatory model in the “post-Jeffersonian world”).
Ironically, partisan advocates contend that nonpartisan elections will strip
away the direct democracy that arrived with partisan primaries. See Hearing
(Aug. 21, 2002), supra note 135 (statement of State Assemblyman Herman
Denny Farrell, New York State Democratic Committee State Chair, warning
that “the proposal to have nonpartisan elections for New York officers may
have the unintended effects for eliminating one of the greatest populus
advances of the earliest 20th century, the nomination of party candidates for
public office by direct primary elections adopted in New York in 1911”).
222
See CITY IN TRANSITION, supra note 2, at 102 (setting forth section
sixty-five of the “Draft Nonpartisan Elections Chapter”). Some cities,
however, including Washington, D.C.; Portland, Or.; and Indianapolis, Ind.,
do not hold a primary. See PRELIMINARY OPTIONS, supra note 2, at app. B.
223
See 42 U.S.C. § 1973(b) (2003) (stating that “a violation of [the
Voting Rights Act] . . . is established if . . . it is shown that the political
processes leading to nomination or election . . . are not equally open to
participation by members of a class of citizens protected [under this
statute] . . .”). See supra Part II.B (discussing the purpose of the Voting
Rights Act).
224
Mercurio, Mayor’s Misstep?, supra note 154. See also Lenora Fulani,
Editorial, The Right Time, NEWSDAY, July 30, 2002, at A28 (noting that the
African American community is increasingly independent minded rather than
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competition, all voters, whether members of the majority party or
not, can have a stake in the elections.225 In noncompetitive
partisan elections, however, this segment of the voting population
is virtually excluded.226 The merits assessed in 1988, when voters
approved special nonpartisan elections, should be considered, and
voters in New York City, including minorities, should recognize
that change would enhance their ability to make their vote
count.227
The new system would give potential candidates equal access
to the ballot, just as they already do in the city’s nonpartisan
special elections.228 The same problems that the nonpartisan
format change intended to resolve in 1988 are at issue—candidate
access to the ballot and voter access to the candidate selection
process.229 In single party jurisdictions where the primary is the
“dispositive election,” primary ballot access rules can be the sole
determinant of whether voters will have a chance to choose
among candidates or whether the rule-makers, i.e., the parties,
being Democratic Party loyalists, as has historically been the case).
225
Mercurio, Bloomberg’s Campaign Promise, supra note 10 (explaining
how one-third of all voters, which are not part of the dominant party, have no
real opportunity to vote meaningfully). See Enrollment Statistics, supra note
187 (showing that, as of November, 2001, 1,417,689 of the 4,237,103
registered voters, about one-third, are not members of the Democratic Party in
New York City).
226
See, e.g., Fornek, supra note 33 (describing the minority Republican
Party’s mayoral primary as “little more than a political ‘Gong Show’ because
of the virtual impossibility of a Republican candidate winning in the general
election).
227
See infra notes 228-230 and accompanying text (describing the
relationship between the purposes of establishing nonpartisan special elections
and those of establishing general nonpartisan municipal elections).
228
See City of New York v. New York City Bd. of Elections, No.
41450/91, at 1 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Apr. 3, 1991), aff’d, __ A.D.2d __ (1st Dept.),
appeal denied, 572 N.E.2d 50 (Mem.) (Apr. 10, 1991) (stating that “the
charter [establishing special nonpartisan elections] would tend to widen rather
than restrict the political process”). See also Part I.A.2 (discussing the motives
behind the establishment of nonpartisan special elections).
229
See PRELIMINARY OPTIONS, supra note 2, at 26 (discussing the
potential to increase opportunities for candidates whose views “may not fit
with the party machines”).
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will make that choice for them.230 Open access to the primary
may be the most beneficial change because whereas support for
nonpartisan elections based on “provisional versus political”
distinctions,231 or expectations that nonpartisan elections eliminate
party influence,232 cannot be guaranteed, increasing ballot access
is an objective that is guaranteed, because allowing all voters to
participate in the primary is a structural change that widens voter
access at a crucial electoral juncture.233
b. Broader Candidate Access to the Ballot
Removing political parties’ favored status in the election
structure increases opportunities for candidates whose views may
not be synchronized with the party line, but whose ideas may be
equally, if not more, beneficial to the community.234 If New York
implements nonpartisan elections, local representatives would
have greater freedom to serve the specific needs within their
community, particularly on issues where a conflict of interest

230

Persily, supra note 122, at 2190 (discussing the potential negative
effects of constructing restrictive ballot access laws).
231
See Hearing (Aug. 15, 2002), supra note 90 (statement of Orlando
Mayor Glenda Hood supporting the idea of local governance as more
provision-oriented than politics-oriented). Mayor Hood, however, also stated
that the policy preferences and party affiliations of elected officials are still
recognized informally and have been useful in forming alliances when the
need arises. Id.
232
Costikyan, supra note 40 (explaining that a Task Force charged with
reviewing New York City government decided not to implement nonpartisan
elections because their examination of such elections in other large cities
showed that they did not eliminate the party from the election process).
233
The 2002 Draft Charter aptly provides that all qualified voters are
qualified to vote in the primary. See CITY IN TRANSITION, supra note 2, at 102
(providing section sixty-five of the “Draft Nonpartisan Elections Chapter”).
234
PRELIMINARY OPTIONS, supra note 2, at 26 n.24 (stating that
“nonpartisan systems give qualified candidates of the minority party or
independents a better chance to succeed . . . [and] permit voters to analyze
local issues independently on their merits and to focus on the intelligence and
experience of the candidates themselves rather than on their political
affiliations”).
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exists with broader state or national party objectives.235 By
facilitating broader candidate access to the ballot at the municipal
election level, nonpartisan elections also encourage their
localized commitment.236
3. New York City Demographics Facilitate Nonpartisan Elections
Additional factors specific to New York City both allay
concerns of those wary of nonpartisan elections and support such
a change. Specifically, the political and social conditions in the
city will allow nonpartisan elections to offer fair minority
representation, adequate candidate funding and sufficient
candidate information without fear of a Republican advantage.
a. Lower Voter Turnout: A Misplaced Fear
Some studies suggest that nonpartisan elections reduce voter
turnout.237 This projected consequence has raised repeated
concerns that weigh against changing to nonpartisan elections.238
These concerns, however, do not consider the particular local
variables contributing to differential turnout.239 Although these
235

See supra note 180 (discussing the risk of compromised commitments
by candidates).
236
See supra Part IV.C.1 (describing how the current partisan system
creates incentive for candidates to remain loyal to the party hierarchy above
their constituency, which can create conflicts of interest when the state and
national party objectives diverge from localized interests).
237
See, e.g., LEE, supra note 11, at 136-38 (generally finding lower voter
turnout from elections in six cities in California in 1955, compared with
turnout at the 1954 general election); Schaffner et al., supra note 32, at 8
(finding lower voter turnout in the mayoral elections in Urbana in 1985 and
Champaign in 1987 than in the turnout in each city for the 1986 Illinois
general election for the U.S. House of Representatives).
238
See, e.g., Sherrill, supra note 105, at 16; Margaret Groarke, Written
Testimony Before The NYC Charter Revision Commission, Brooklyn (Aug.
13, 2002) (on file with author).
239
See Hearing (Aug. 20, 2002), supra note 163 (statement of Professor
Frank Barry, a researcher with New York University Taub Urban Research
Center and a former staff member with New York City’s Campaign Finance
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concerns may be legitimate, they are largely inapplicable in New
York.
First, low voter turnout is evident in municipal elections
across the country, regardless of whether the system is partisan
or nonpartisan.240 Low turnout, moreover, occurs in local
elections that are not held simultaneously with the election of
officials to state and national offices, in which higher profile
campaigns tend to draw a larger voter turnout.241
Second, conclusions from studies done in the mid-twentieth
century may not be applicable today in light of changing urban
conditions in the last few decades, particularly driven by the
enactment of the 1965 Voting Rights Act.242 Moreover, findings
in other studies have differed, and variances existed even within
studies, which attenuate the applicability and validity of the
sweeping conclusion that nonpartisan elections reduce voter
turnout.243
Third, reduced voter turnout is unlikely to occur in New
York because of variables unique to the city, including
population and competitiveness of the elections.244 Studies have
shown that larger cities tend to exhibit more political activity.245
Board, noting that studies showing lower voter turnout did not control for
various demographic factors).
240
CITY IN TRANSITION, supra note 2, at C-13 (summarizing Dr.
Lichtman’s testimony at the August 15, 2002 public hearing).
241
Id. at 91.
242
See Hearing (Aug. 15, 2002) supra note 90 (statement of Dr.
Lichtman that the Voting Rights Act “dramatically increased participation and
involvement of minorities in the political process”); Voting Rights Act, 42
U.S.C. § 1973 (2003) (federally criminalizing the use of any voting standards,
practices or procedures that abridged the right to vote on account of color).
243
See, e.g., LEE, supra note 11, at 138 (finding “variations in turnout in
local races during a 25-year period” in three cities in California and noting
that variables such as “the absence of competition, or the irregular intensity of
some civic issue” may explain the fluctuations); Schaffner et al., supra note
32, at 8 (finding that while their reduced turnout hypothesis held for Urbana
and Champaign, it did not hold in Asheville).
244
Hearing (Aug. 20, 2002), supra note 163 (statement of Professor
Frank Barry).
245
See, e.g., LEE, supra note 11, at 117. For example, Los Angeles and
Chicago both administer nonpartisan elections, yet, parties have remained
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Similarly, in light of the role of political parties as a major
generator of electoral competition, political parties are more
closely tied to competitive elections and less competitive elections
might justify the use of nonpartisan elections.246
New York City is the largest city in the nation, with a
population of more than eight million, in contrast to the much
smaller cities that showed lower voter turnout.247 The majority of
cities examined in those studies also had competitive elections,248
while many of New York City’s elections are largely
noncompetitive.249 In light of the city’s characteristics and the
limited applicability of findings from studies showing that
nonpartisan elections reduce voter turnout, low voter turnout
should not be an obstacle to considering nonpartisan elections as
a viable means of reinvigorating the city’s municipal elections.

politically active. Hearing (Aug. 20, 2002), supra note 163 (statement of
Professor Frank Barry). When Chicago held its first nonpartisan election in
1999, voter turnout was comparable to its turnout under their former partisan
system. Hearing (Aug. 15, 2002), supra note 90 (statement of Dr. Lichtman).
246
See Hearing (Aug. 20, 2002), supra note 163 (statement of Professor
Frank Barry, explaining that whereas two-party systems exist largely to create
competition, in single party systems, the “competition gets pushed into the
primary system,” effectively excluding approximately one-third of all voters
from the decisive election, who are not majority party members.). Nonpartisan
systems would bring the excluded one-third back into the decision-making
process. See id.
247
POPULATION DIV., DEP’T OF CITY PLANNING, POPULATION BY
MUTUALLY EXCLUSIVE RACE & HISPANIC ORIGIN, NEW YORK CITY &
BOROUGHS, 1999 AND 2000 (indicating that the total population in the city is
8,008,278),
http://www.nyc.gov/html/dcp/html/census/popdiv.html
(last
visited Apr. 20, 2003); LEE, supra note 11, at 189-94 (noting that the
populations of the six cities studied varied from 15,000 to 133,000).
248
See, e.g., LEE, supra note 11, at 61.
249
Hearing (Aug. 20, 2002), supra note 163 (statement of Professor
Frank Barry). A competitive election is distinguishable from a noncompetitive
one in its ability “to present contests to the voters in which the winners are not
predetermined.” Persily, supra note 122, at 2190. New York elections are not
competitive in that the winners typically win in a landslide victory at the
general election, while the results are much closer in the primary election. See
id.; Mercurio, Time Has Come, supra note 163.
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b. Minority Voters Would Benefit
Nonpartisan elections strengthen the ability of minorities to
elect candidates.250 In the fifty largest cities in the country, more
minority mayors have been elected through nonpartisan than
partisan elections.251 Moreover, New York City minority voting
patterns in nonpartisan special elections have shown no consistent
decrease in minority voter turnout compared to white turnout.252
Competitive minority candidates, however, tend to increase
minority voter turnout.253
Nonpartisan elections would increase participation by
minority voters because voters that join the ranks of parties other
than the Democratic Party or choose not to join a political party
would be able to vote in a nonpartisan primary.254 Moreover, all
minority voters stand to benefit. Blacks and Hispanics constitute
twenty-three percent and twenty-five percent of the voting age
population, respectively.255 With such a high percentage of the
voting population, their votes are significant enough for any
candidate to seek their support.256
250

See supra Part II.B (discussing minorities’ ability to elect candidates of
their choice within nonpartisan systems).
251
See Hearing (Aug. 15, 2002), supra note 90 (statement of Dr.
Lichtman); supra notes 101-104 and accompanying text (discussing the success
of minority candidates in nonpartisan elections compared with partisan
elections).
252
See Hearing (Aug. 15, 2002), supra note 90 (statement of Dr.
Lichtman, reviewing the results of his statistical research of nonpartisan
special election voter turnout between 1992 and 1998).
253
Id.; see supra Part II.B.2 (discussing the inclusion of minority turnout
concerns in the Department of Justice’s review process under Section 5 of the
Voting Rights Act); supra Part II.B.3 (discussing the correlation between
minority candidates and minority turnout).
254
See Hearing (Aug. 13, 2002), supra note 132 (statement of Genevieve
Torres, a political activist from Brooklyn) (stating that “if you look in the
black and Latino community, a majority of youth is deciding that they’d like to
opt out of deciding on a party or they’d rather vote as independents”).
255
See Hearing (Aug. 15, 2002), supra note 90 (statement of Dr.
Lichtman).
256
See Kresky, supra note 208 (noting that minority voters’ support is
essential to any local electoral victory).
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c. Candidates Would Receive Adequate Funding

New York City provides financial assistance to candidates for
municipal office through an innovative campaign finance
program.257 In 2001, the program provided forty-one million
dollars to candidates, far more than any funding provided by
parties.258 The city’s purposes for implementing the program
included “[making] candidates and elected officials more
responsive to citizens, rather than special interests; . . . [helping]
credible candidates who may not have access to ‘big money’ to
run competitive campaigns; [and leveling] the political playing
field by enabling all serious candidates, whether challengers or
incumbents, to compete on more equal footing.”259 The city’s
public financing system is the most generous and comprehensive
reform program among American cities.260 Indeed, the policy
goals of nonpartisan elections—encouraging competition, access
and political responsiveness—closely resemble those that
motivated passage of the city’s campaign finance reform and are
equally legitimate.261

257

See The New York City Campaign Finance Board, For Candidates, at
http://www.cfb.nyc.ny.us/for_candidates/index.htm (last visited Apr. 24,
2003) (generally describing the types of financial assistance given to
candidates).
258
Hearing (Aug. 15, 2002), supra note 90 (statement of Dr. Lichtman
citing statistics compiled by the Campaign Finance Board).
259
The New York City Campaign Finance Board, The Program and the
Law, at http://www.cfb.nyc.ny.us/program_law/index.htm (last visited Apr.
24, 2003).
260
Hearing (Aug. 20, 2002), supra note 163 (statement of Frank Barry).
See also New York City Campaign Finance Board, Message from the
[Campaign Finance Program] Chairman, at http://www.cfb.nyc.ny.us/about/
chairman_statement.htm (last visited Apr. 24, 2003) (describing the purposes
of the Program, and noting that its comprehensiveness makes it the “vanguard
of the [campaign finance] reform movement”). In contrast, many cities have
no public financing at all. See, e.g., Hearing (Aug. 15, 2002) supra note 90
(statement of Orlando Mayor Glenda Hood that candidates in Orlando do not
receive public funds to assist in their campaigns).
261
Supra Part I.A.3 (highlighting Mayor Bloomberg’s premises for
establishing nonpartisan elections).
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d. New York Has a Wealth of Political Information
Sufficient sources of information are available in New York
City to fill in the gaps in the event that parties decided to reduce
their informational role in elections. New York City has an
undeniably active, “aggressive” and opinionated press.262 In
addition, the Campaign Finance Board is required to inform
voters about municipal candidates via the Voter Guide.263
Historically, newspapers have been an important part of the
election and political process.264 Today, press activity remains a
significant variable in the election results of large cities.265
262

Hearing (Aug. 20, 2002), supra note 163 (statement of Professor
Frank Barry). Consider the variety of perspectives available in the New York
Times, New York Post, New York Daily News, Wall Street Journal, Newsday
and the recently arrived New York Sun. See, e.g., Scott McConnell, Editorial,
We’re Trying to Save Right Wing from Itself, WALL ST. J., Jan. 23, 2003, at
A15 (noting “hefty neoconservative influence” over a few publications,
including the New York Sun and the Wall Street Journal); Sridhar Pappu, As
Blix Unloads, News Comes Back to U.N. Bureaus, N.Y. OBSERVER, Feb. 3,
2003, at 3 (referring to the liberal leanings of the New York Times); Monty
Phan, NY Sun Seeks Circulation Rise, NEWSDAY, Nov. 1, 2002, at A59
(explaining that the New York Sun’s slogan, “‘Expect a different point of
view’ . . . refers to the philosophy that a reader interested in the style of news
provided by the New York Times would value a ‘second point of view’
provided by the Sun”); David Ward, Editorial, Remain a Coveted Voice for
News Analysis, PR WEEK, Mar. 31, 2003, at 10 (positing that the N.Y. Times
is generally conservative); Tony Blankley, Watch This Election’s Wheel of
Fate, WASH. TIMES, Oct. 30, 2002, at A19 (referring to the N.Y. Daily News
as liberal); Warren Strugatch, Manhattan Law Firm Makes a Successful Foray,
N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 16, 2003 (describing a Newsday columnist as a “liberal
foul”).
263
NEW YORK CITY CHARTER tit. 52 § 10 (2002); N.Y.C. R. & REGS.
tit. 52, § 10-02 (2002) (listing information that statutorily must be included in
the Voter Guide).
264
HAWLEY, supra note 1, at 53 (nothing that “[t]he primary sources of
political information regarding local elections, especially where parties are
inactive, are community organizations and the mass media”); LEE, supra note
11, at 78 (listing local newspapers as one of the important influences in
election politics).
265
LEE, supra note 11, at 78 (explaining that local newspapers are valued
more highly for their candidate endorsements in cities with larger
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According to studies of municipal judicial elections, in ninetyfive percent of the cities with populations above 50,000 in which
the press was active, “supported candidates were reported as
winning ‘many times’ or ‘always.’”266 Therefore, New York
City’s diverse, active press is a significant alternative to
partisanship for informing the vote.
The city’s Campaign Finance Board also provides the Voter
Guide, required by the City Charter.267 The guide provides
biographical information about each local candidate, including
the name, political party enrollment, previous and current public
offices held, current occupation, prior employment and positions,
experience in public service, educational background and major
organizational affiliations.268 It also includes “concise statements
on the candidate’s principles, platform or views, for each
candidate in the election who has submitted, in a timely manner,
a candidate Voter Guide statement . . . .”269 This program is
unique to New York City and ensures that the city’s electorate
will not be uninformed in the event that political parties diminish
their activity.270 In addition to the Voter Guide, the Campaign
Finance Board funds candidates to further the candidate’s own
efforts to produce and distribute information.271
e. Republican Advantage? Not Here.
There would be no Republican advantage in New York City
populations). See also Champagne, supra note 200, at 1421 (describing how
the mass media can even be critical to the success of a judicial election).
Judicial elections are comparable to many of the local elections such as city
council elections because both are considered low-visibility races. See id. at
1412; see also text accompanying note 240 (discussing the issue of low voter
turnout in municipal elections, which generally corresponds to the lowvisibility nature of an election).
266
LEE, supra note 11, at 148.
267
NEW YORK CITY CHARTER tit. 52 § 10 (2002).
268
Id. at § 10(b)(1).
269
Id. at § 10(b)(2).
270
See NEW YORK CITY CHARTER tit. 52 § 10 (2002).
271
See supra Part IV.C.3.c (discussing the Campaign Finance Board’s
efforts in assisting candidates financially).
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because the conditions that create such an advantage are absent.
Belief in the universal existence of a Republican advantage in
nonpartisan elections is based on the misunderstanding that
nonpartisan elections eliminate political party involvement.272
Studies in the 1960s as well as a more recent study showed a
Republican advantage in nonpartisan elections.273 Those findings
are repeated in media even today without proper consideration of
the funding resources uniquely available in New York City,
which were established specifically to reduce the influence of
wealth in elections.274 This concern continues to be espoused in
anti-Republican circles, though occasionally the arguments are
dressed in sheep’s clothing.275
Among the bases for fearing a Republican advantage is the
concern that nonpartisan elections end party involvement and
issue awareness.276 Common arguments regarding the Republican
advantage combine the three additional concerns, i.e., candidate
272

See supra Part I.B (explaining that structurally, nonpartisan elections
still allow political parties to carry on most of their campaign activities).
273
See, e.g., HAWLEY, supra note 1, at 33 (discussing the results and
implications of his study, which showed the partisan bias of nonpartisanship in
city council and mayoral positions in eighty-eight cities in California between
1957-1966); Lascher, supra note 150 (discussing his study published in 1991,
which surveyed California county supervisors elected by nonpartisan elections;
county supervisor positions are functionally comparable to city council
offices).
274
See, e.g., Muzzio, Bloomberg Jumps Gun, supra note 56
(“Nonpartisan systems, especially in large cities, seem to engender a
Republican bias.”); see also supra Part IV.C.3.c (discussing why wealth, a
proxy argument for the Republican advantage, is inapplicable).
275
See, e.g., HAWLEY, supra note 1, at 33; Press Release, Denny
Farrell, supra note 67 (emphasizing the benefits that political parties bring to
elections, rather than stating any belief that Republicans may benefit from the
change).
276
This presumption can be inferred from the numerous comments that
have been made by partisan advocates who emphasize the benefits that
political parties bring to the electoral process in general as if parties will not
choose to provide them under a nonpartisan system. See, e.g., CITY IN
TRANSITION, supra note 2, at 92; Amy Bridges, Editorial, In Elections,
Parties Matter, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 30, 2002, at A18; Press Release, Denny
Farrell, supra note 67.
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wealth, reduced voter turnout and reduced candidate
information.277 These are not problems in New York City.278
Recent evidence from large, highly political cities like Chicago
indicates that parties continue to play an active role in local
nonpartisan elections.279 If parties remain committed to the results
in local elections, they must also remain dedicated to informing
the voters on their local issue positions in spite of the loss of the
spoils system inherent in “formalized politics.”280
In fact, there is a strong possibility that a nonpartisan primary
would result in New Yorkers choosing two Democratic
candidates to face off in a general election.281 As of November
2002, the Republican Party had only 536,000 New Yorkers,
whereas the Democratic Party had 2.8 million.282 With such
lopsided numbers, candidates that face off in the current general
277

See supra Parts IV.C.3.a-d (describing these concerns but also
explaining why conditions in New York City would not create significant
turnout, funding or informational problems if nonpartisan elections were
established).
278
See Lascher, supra note 150 (contending that Republicans’ greater
financial means with which to increase name recognition and improve
candidate image may explain why Republican candidates have done better in
nonpartisan elections relative to their share of registered Republican Party
voters, as he found in his study of elections of California municipal officials);
279
See Rick Pearson, Daley Triumphs in Landslide, CHI. TRIB., Feb. 24,
1999, at 1 (noting that in Chicago’s first nonpartisan municipal election,
“[Mayor] Daley . . . used his powerful political organization” to win the
election).
280
See Northup, supra note 28, at 1680 (describing the political party as
an institution not only of policies, but of patronage and personnel as well); see
also Hearing (Aug.13, 2002), supra note 132 (statement of City Council
member David Yassky acknowledging that “parties can . . . serve a nonhelpful role as patronage organizations”).
281
For example, in Los Angeles’s 2001 nonpartisan mayoral primary,
two Democrats faced off in the runoff election. L.A. Mayoral Race Heads to
Runoff, CHI. SUN-TIMES, April 12, 2001, at 24. In cities where one party is
dominant, competition like that in two-party contests is possible if there is
lively debate over controversial local issues, thus providing more of the checks
and balances that party contests normally offer. PHILLIPS, supra note 172, at
207.
282
Enrollment Statistics, supra note 187.
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election system, which advances only one candidate from each
party, hardly represents the majority of New Yorkers’ views.
Nonpartisan elections have greater potential to more accurately
represent the public’s policy perspectives, create a more
competitive election and keep candidates accountable.
V. DRAFTING THE NONPARTISAN ELECTION LAW: STRUCTURAL
CONSIDERATIONS
If and when the Charter Revision Commission decides to
propose establishing nonpartisan elections, they will have the
flexibility to structure the nonpartisan election law in a way that
best suits the New York City context. In drafting the charter
sections, the Commission may determine the scope of the
nonpartisan laws, whether to use a primary and the number of
voter signatures required to be placed on a ballot.283
A. The Commission’s 2002 Draft Proposal: The Contents
The commission included a draft charter chapter establishing
nonpartisan elections for local elective offices in the September
3, 2002 report.284 As set forth in this draft, candidates would be
nominated by nonpartisan designating petitions, with a specified
number of registered voters’ signatures required for placement on
the primary ballot.285 The signature requirements for candidates
using the nonpartisan designating petition derive from State
Election Law § 6-142, which governs independent nominating

283

See infra Parts V.A-B and accompanying text (summarizing the
various nonpartisan election laws utilized in Chicago, Ill.; Houston, Tex.; Los
Angeles, Cal.; and Seattle, Wash.).
284
See CITY IN TRANSITION, supra note 2, at 98.
285
CITY IN TRANSITION, supra note 2, at 99 (setting forth section sixtyone of the “Draft Nonpartisan Elections Chapter”). “Nonpartisan designating
petitions are analogous to independent nominating petitions.” Id. at 109
(discussing section sixty-one of the “Draft Nonpartisan Elections Chapter”).
New York State Election Law currently determines the number of signatures
that must be collected on an independent nominating petition to be placed on
the ballot. N.Y. ELEC. LAW § 6-142 (McKinney 2003).
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petitions and which requires a higher number of signatures than
does a partisan designating petition.286 The offices that would
utilize the nonpartisan election system would include mayor,
comptroller, public advocate, city council member and borough
president.287 Every qualified voter would be entitled to vote in the
nonpartisan primary election.288 The candidates receiving the
largest and second largest number of votes would advance to a
general runoff election.289 No party labels or symbols would be
286

N.Y. ELEC. LAW § 6-142.When using a independent nominating
petition to qualify to be placed on a ballot, the state election law requires
7,500 signatures for any citywide public office and 4,000 signatures for any
county or borough office, the same numbers needed when using a partisan
designating petition. Compare N.Y. ELEC. LAW § 6-142 and N.Y. ELEC.
LAW § 6-136 (McKinney 2003). For any city council district office, however,
two thousand seven hundred signatures are needed when using a nonpartisan
designating petition compared with only nine hundred signatures needed when
using a partisan designating petition. Id.
287
CITY IN TRANSITION, supra note 2, at 99 (providing section sixty-one
of the “Draft Nonpartisan Elections Chapter”).
288
Id.
289
Id. at 103 (setting forth section sixty-six of the “Draft Nonpartisan
Elections Chapter,” which requires that “[t]he board of elections shall certify
the names of the persons who received the largest and next largest number of
votes for mayor, comptroller, public advocate, member of the city council,
and borough president, respectively”). Rather than hold a runoff election with
only the top two candidates, as provided in the draft charter chapter, Dr.
Lichtman suggests that by having the top three candidates who obtain over
twenty-five percent of the vote move into the runoff, minorities would enhance
their opportunity to be effective in the primary and general election.
PRELIMINARY OPTIONS, supra note 2, at A-4. He contends that the significant
size and strength of minority groups might make a three-way split beneficial
because it would allow a candidate to be elected with a plurality of votes. Id.
He argues that because studies of minority electoral patterns in New York City
show that minorities do not consistently vote cohesively, minorities are
generally not able to control the party vote despite their strong affiliation with
the Democratic Party. See Hearing (Aug. 15, 2002), supra note 90 (statement
of Dr. Lichtman). Ensuring an “equal opportunity to participate meaningfully
in the political process in the jurisdiction,” 28 C.F.R. § 51.58(b)(1) (2003),
and “influence elections and the decisionmaking of elected officials in the
jurisdiction,” 28 C.F.R. § 51.58(b)(2) (2003), are of primary concern in
rewriting the election rules. A runoff election with two candidates, however,
will ensure that these opportunities are safeguarded, while additionally
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allowed on the ballot or voting machine at the primary or general
election.290
B. Reflections on the Commission’s 2002 Draft Proposal
In considering how the City Charter should be revised, the
policy goals of nonpartisan elections should be evident in the
construction of the revisions. First, cities may designate the
scope of nonpartisan elections by applying an election system to
all, or only selected, municipal offices.291 Although the charter
could be revised to apply only to those offices that repeatedly
suffer from lack of competition, structural consistency and
efficiency would be furthered by applying a nonpartisan system
to all municipal elections.292 New York City voting patterns
indicate that there is virtually no competition at the general
producing a winner that has received majority support from the electorate.
Blacks and Hispanics constitute a substantial proportion of the voting
population—twenty-three percent and twenty-five percent, respectively. CITY
IN TRANSITION, supra note 2, at C-14. These proportions are significant
enough for candidates to rationally desire to secure their support, even if the
minority groups do not vote cohesively.
290
CITY IN TRANSITION, supra note 2, at 104 (providing section sixtynine of the “Draft Nonpartisan Elections Chapter”).
291
For example, Chicago, Ill.; Los Angeles, Cal.; Seattle, Wash.; and
Houston, Tex., have established nonpartisan elections for both mayor and
members of city council. 65 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. § 20/21-5 (2003); L.A.
ELEC. CODE §§ 424, 426 (2000); SEATTLE CITY CHARTER art. XIX § 1
(2002), HOUSTON CITY CHARTER § 5 (2001). Chicago and Los Angeles also
extend nonpartisan elections to the comptroller and city treasurer offices. 65
ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. § 20/21-5 (2003); L.A. ELEC. CODE § 424, 426
(2000). Houston also extends nonpartisan elections to city controller.
HOUSTON CITY CHARTER § 5 (2001). Los Angeles and Seattle also extend
nonpartisan elections to the city attorney office. L.A. ELEC. CODE § 424, 426
(2000); SEATTLE CITY CHARTER art. XIX § 1 (2002).
292
A hybrid partisan-nonpartisan local election system was used in
Chicago prior to 1995, in which a nonpartisan system was used to elect
aldermen, while a partisan system was used to elect its citywide offices,
including mayor, city clerk and treasurer. Fornek, supra note 33. The state
legislature voted to change the citywide office elections to the nonpartisan
format for structural efficiency purposes. Id. The costs of running a single
system are lower than that for the hybrid system. Id.
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election for city council, comptroller, public advocate, and
borough president.293 Even if a nonpartisan format would not
necessarily enhance the competitiveness of the mayoral race,
utilizing the nonpartisan system for all offices would provide a
more efficient administrative approach.294
Of the forty-one largest cities administering nonpartisan
elections, the majority only require a general runoff election if no
candidate receives a majority of votes in the primary.295
Contingent runoff elections were created in response to the
inefficiencies of holding two elections that produced the same
result, which is particularly common in cities where voters are
heavily registered with one party.296 The 2002 Draft Charter does
not provide for this contingency,297 but the commission should
293

Mercurio, Bloomberg’s Campaign Promise, supra note 10. See supra
note 216 (describing voting statistics for the 2001 primary and general
election, showing major disparities in votes between the winners and the
runners-up in municipal general elections).
294
See supra note 292 (discussing Chicago’s streamlined nonpartisan
system). The mayoral office has seen more competition, as evidenced by the
Republican Party affiliation of the current and last mayor in the Democratic
Party-dominated city. See supra note 194 (citing voting statistics for the
2001mayoral election and comparing them to those in other citywide and
councilmanic offices). See also Hearing (Aug. 21, 2002), supra note 135
(statement of former New York City Mayor Koch noting that the current
structure offers sufficient checks and balances, reflected in the city’s voting
pattern, which has “been to elect a Republican every 30 years when the
Democrats have really screwed it up bad”). But see Shipper, supra note 185
(quoting former Mayor Giuliani, who disagreed with the belief that the
mayoral race was competitive, stating that he was “only the third Republican
mayor in 100 years”).
295
See CITY IN TRANSITION, supra note 2, at E12-E15. See supra note 71
(listing those cities that do not hold a general election if a candidate has
received a majority of votes in the primary).
296
See Fornek, supra note 33 (explaining that the primary reason for
establishing this contingent general election format was “to simplify elections
and save taxpayers money”); see also Hardy, supra note 33 (observing that in
Democratic Party-dominated Chicago, “Republicans haven’t won a Chicago
mayoral race since 1927”).
297
See CITY IN TRANSITION, supra note 2, at 102 (setting forth section
sixty-five of the “Draft Nonpartisan Elections Chapter,” which establishes a
nonpartisan primary); id. at 104 (setting forth section sixty-eight of the “Draft
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consider its potential benefits. Contingent runoff elections could
provide financial benefits to the city.298 Moreover, since the
nonpartisan primary would be open to all qualified voters,299 the
runoff would not be essential to ensure equal voting access.
The signature requirement for independent nominating
petitions also implicates ballot access issues. The experience with
nonpartisan elections in Chicago revealed that an onerously high
signature requirement threatened to render their mayoral election
uncontested.300 Candidate ballot access problems harm not only
potential candidates, but also voters, who may not have the
opportunity to vote for candidates of their choosing.301 This
attenuates the representative nature of the democracy.302
Nonpartisan Elections Chapter,” which provides that “nominees . . . shall
advance to the general election”) (emphasis added).
298
See Fornek, supra note 33 (quoting a spokesman for the Chicago
Board of Elections who stated that “[t]he city could save $2 million to $2.5
million if no runoffs were required for the citywide offices”). More likely than
not, however, the larger number of candidates typically on a primary ballot,
the division of votes among those candidates, and the numerous offices being
filled at each election will inevitably require a runoff for at least one office.
Id. (noting that “those savings would disappear if even one race required a
runoff”).
299
See CITY IN TRANSITION, supra note 2, at 102-03 (setting forth section
sixty-five of the “Draft Nonpartisan Elections Chapter,” which states that
“[e]very qualified voter shall be entitled to vote at such nonpartisan primary
election”).
300
Steve Neal, Editorial, Change Unfair Petition Rules: Candidates for
City Offices Need 25,000 Signatures to Run, CHI. SUN-TIMES, July 29, 2002
(describing the problems candidates faced with access to the ballot due to the
high signature requirement for Chicago’s citywide elective offices). The
nonpartisan legislation failed to specify the number of signatures needed for a
candidate to gain access to the ballot. Id. The Chicago Board of Elections thus
imposed a legacy rule upon all citywide offices, which required all candidates
to collect 25,000 signatures, a rule previously imposed only on candidates
running as an independent or new party candidate. Id. In contrast, only 5,000
signatures are required to run for statewide offices. Id.
301
See Persily, supra note 122, at 2188-89 (explaining that “ballot access
laws . . . hinder . . . political participation by restricting the voter’s
opportunity to cast a ballot for the candidate of their choice”).
302
Id. at 2189 (noting that the distinctive trait of democratic participation
in elections from Communist systems is “the existence of some meaningful
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In a typical partisan contest, the signature requirements are
significantly higher for candidates not endorsed by a party, which
has raised concerns that “the primary becomes little more than a
state-sponsored endorsement of the candidate of the party
leadership.”303 The differential signature requirement does not
appear to be an issue under a nonpartisan system because all
candidates would have to collect the same number of signatures,
regardless of party endorsements.304 Implementing the higher
signature requirement for all candidates, however, could
potentially recreate the partisan system bias in the nonpartisan
structure if only those candidates supported by the dominant
political party are able to attain the signature threshold.305
Therefore, the Commission should consider the broader ballot
access concern that derives from an overly high signature
requirement in general and counterbalance the need for a
signature requirement that is high enough to avoid the use of
laundry list ballots.306
CONCLUSION
The problematic reality of New York City’s current local
election system becomes evident when the invalid assumptions
and their supposed negative effects on voter turnout, minority
power and the Republican advantage are laid aside. As a system
overwhelmingly dominated by one party across a majority of
local elective offices, the current system fails to create the
competition necessary to keep candidates and officials locally
range of choices for which a voter can express a preference”).
303
Persily, supra note 122, at 2201. For example, New York State’s
current election law requires three times as many signatures for city council
candidates who lack party backing. N.Y. ELEC. LAW § 6-142 (McKinney
2003).
304
See CITY IN TRANSITION, supra note 2, at 99-100 (setting forth section
sixty-one of the “Draft Nonpartisan Elections Chapter,” which provides for
uniform petition signature requirements).
305
See id.
306
See supra Part I.A.1 (discussing the problems of laundry list ballots,
and the movement to implement short ballots, particularly in nonpartisan
elections).
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accountable and does not open the election process to all voters in
the primary, where the vote really matters. The city’s partisan
system restricts access to candidates that could bring positive
change. Nonpartisan elections would pave the way to return the
electoral decision to all of New York City’s voters and ensure a
responsive government.

